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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the sufficiency and effectiveness of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) cyber policies against cyber threats, considering 
the recent cyber cases and incidents that could be related to NATO’s cyber 
defense. The authors use analytical and descriptive approaches to answer the 
research questions by examining the categories of cyber threats facing NATO 
and the policies implemented to fight against cyber operations and attacks. 
Finally, the authors make policy recommendations in order to respond to cyber 
threats more effectively in regard to eight specific areas: cooperation with the 
European Union; relations with business enterprises; information sharing among 
members; education, training, and exercises; capabilities of NATO 
Communications and Information Agency (NCIA); critical infrastructure 
protection; cyber law and legislature; and collective cyber defense.  
The cyber domain is a challenging arena in which to carry out operations 
and develop policies. NATO can be considered successful in cyberspace; 
however, the alliance should be aware that there is no limit to the development of 
capabilities, especially in cyber defense issues.  
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 
A. BACKGROUND .............................................................................. 1 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE ................................................................. 3 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .............................................................. 3 
D. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................ 3 
E. OVERVIEW ..................................................................................... 4 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................. 7 
A. EARLY WARNING FOR CYBERWAR ........................................... 7 
B. DEFINING KEY CYBER TERMS .................................................... 8 
C. CYBER ISSUES BECOMING MORE SERIOUS .......................... 10 
D. CYBERWAR IS REAL .................................................................. 12 
E. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ......................................................... 12 
F. TALLINN MANUAL ....................................................................... 14 
G. CYBER POWER AND NUCLEAR LESSONS .............................. 16 
H. CYBERWAR AND NATO ............................................................. 17 
I. SUMMARY .................................................................................... 20 
III. THE CYBER THREATS AGAINST NATO .............................................. 21 
A. CYBER THREATS ........................................................................ 21 
1. Introduction ....................................................................... 21 
2. Categories of Cyber Threats ............................................ 22 
B. CYBER ACTORS .......................................................................... 25 
1. State Actors ....................................................................... 26 
2. Non-state Actors ............................................................... 28 
3. Most Active and Dangerous Cyber Actors ..................... 31 
C. CYBER INCIDENTS AND CASES................................................ 31 
1. Serbian-NATO Conflict (1999) .......................................... 32 
2. Estonia (2007) ................................................................... 34 
3. Georgia (2008) ................................................................... 37 
4. Stuxnet (2010) ................................................................... 40 
5. Ukraine (2014) ................................................................... 41 
6. Other Cyber Incidents ...................................................... 43 
D. SUMMARY .................................................................................... 45 
IV. NATO POLICIES TO FIGHT AGAINST CYBER THREATS ................... 47 
A. EVOLUTION ................................................................................. 47 
 viii 
1. Prague Summit (2002) ...................................................... 48 
2. Riga Summit (2006) .......................................................... 48 
3. Bucharest Summit (2008) ................................................. 49 
4. Strasburg-Kehl Summit (2009) ........................................ 50 
5. Lisbon Summit (2010) ...................................................... 51 
6. Chicago Summit (2012) .................................................... 53 
7. Wales Summit (2014) ........................................................ 55 
8. Warsaw Summit (2016) ..................................................... 57 
B. GOVERNANCE ............................................................................. 58 
1. Cyber Defense Policy Updates ........................................ 59 
2. Hierarchical Responsibilities in Governance ................. 60 
C. SUMMARY .................................................................................... 62 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO RESPOND CYBER THREATS ..... 65 
A. CYBER DEFENSE PLEDGE ........................................................ 66 
B. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC 
AREAS .......................................................................................... 67 
1. Cooperation with the European Union (EU) ................... 68 
2. Relations with Business Enterprises .............................. 70 
3. Information Sharing Among Members ............................ 73 
4. Education, Training, and Exercises ................................ 76 
5. Capabilities of NCIA ......................................................... 79 
6. Critical Infrastructure Protection ..................................... 81 
7. Cyber Law and Legislature .............................................. 84 
8. Collective Cyber Defense (Article 5) ............................... 86 
C. SUMMARY .................................................................................... 88 
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 91 
A. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................ 91 
B. CONSIDERATIONS ...................................................................... 94 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ............................... 95 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..................................................................................... 97 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFCEA  Armed Forces Communication and Electronics Association 
APT   Advanced Persistent Threat 
C3   Consultation, Command and Control 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
CCDCOE  Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence 
CDMA  Cyber Defense Management Authority 
CDMB  Cyber Defense Management Board 
CERT-EU Computer Emergency Response Team of the European 
Union 
CIP   Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CIS   Communications and Information Systems 
DDoS   Distributed Denial of Service (Attack)  
DNS   Domain Name Service 
DoS   Denial of Service 
EU   European Union 
FOC    Full Operational Capability 
MISP   Malware Information Sharing Platform 
NAC   North Atlantic Council 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCIA   NATO Communications and Information Agency 
NCIRC  NATO Computer Incident Response Capability 
NICP   NATO Industry Cyber Partnership 
OSCE   Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
UN   United Nations 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We would like to express our great appreciation and gratitude to our 
country and the Turkish Armed Forces for providing us the opportunity to study at 
the Naval Postgraduate School. We would like to address our special thanks to 
our advisors, Professor Bryan J. Hudgens and Dr. Dorothy E. Denning, for their 
contributions, patience, support, and guidance. We also would like to express our 
appreciation to our instructors, fellow students, and school personnel during this 
pleasant journey. To our families, please know that without your love and 
support, nothing could be possible. We thank you very much. 
 
 xii 





Information supremacy has been one of the most significant advantages 
on the battlefield. As Sun Tzu stated in his book The Art of War, 
if you know the enemy and yourself, you need not fear the result of 
a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every 
victory gained, you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the 
enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. (Thamm, 
2010, p. 3) 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (1993) portray the triumphs of Mongols 
from the perspective of information dominance. Although Mongols were almost 
always disadvantaged in their numbers compared to their adversaries, they 
conquered and ruled one of the biggest empires in the world for more than a 
century. The key reason why Mongols were successful in the 13th century was 
their information dominance in the battlefield. Mongolian arrow riders prevented 
the opponent’s commanders from communicating effectively with their warriors in 
the field. Also, Mongolian messengers used to take three to four more horses 
with them during travel so as to not be bound by the horses’ physical limits and 
so that they could deliver information quickly. Much like the real-time intelligence 
obtained from satellites today, the information gathered about the enemy’s 
tactics, intentions, and situation provided the Mongolian forces an enormous 
advantage. 
The Mongol example teaches us the importance of information dominance 
for an effective defense. When we look at the world today, we see the cyber 
realm as one of the most conflicted arenas for information dominance. The 
Mongol example teaches another lesson when it is examined from the 
perspective of cyber warfare. Cyberwar depends on strategic interaction, that is, 
by how one sees and manipulates the conflict rather than on merely having high 
technological capabilities (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993).  
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New technologies and inventions change people’s lives and the world we 
live in. Among the most transformative inventions of the last century were the 
Internet and information technologies. These developments have had far-
reaching effects not only on the social lives of individuals, but also on the 
defense concerns of nation states. While the Internet has made the world a 
smaller place by providing unprecedented opportunities and capabilities to 
connect with other people, it also has made the world more dangerous because 
of the attendant security issues. Information technology can be used by 
individuals with malicious intentions to commit cybercrimes, cyber espionage, 
cyberterrorism, or cyber warfare. Even a small number of people can execute 
these wide-ranging and devastating activities, which creates asymmetry in the 
force equations. Therefore, the introduction of the cyber domain has changed 
how states defend themselves forever.  
Like nation states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needs to 
build a strong cyber defense to deter and fight against cyber threats. However, 
implementing successful policies and having effective cyber defense forces is not 
an easy task. Keeping up with every new development in the cyber realm, 
renewing policies, and improving forces take serious efforts. This gets more 
complicated when addressing the varying opinions and concerns from member 
countries; however, it does not change the fact that the alliance still needs to 
provide collective defense in the cyber domain. 
NATO’s cyber policy has a significant role in its collective defense. The 
cyber domain has created unprecedented threats and vulnerabilities to NATO. To 
sustain its collective defense objectives, NATO needs to be ready and capable of 
coping with potential cyber-attacks. The policies and strategies that define 
NATO’s cyber response plan will determine how well prepared NATO is to 
address cyber threats. 
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B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the sufficiency and effectiveness 
of NATO’s cyber policies against cyber threats, considering the cyber incidents 
that NATO encountered in past years. This thesis focuses on the cyber policies 
NATO has developed so far and determines whether these policies are sufficient 
to overcome cyber threats. It presents the advantages and disadvantages of 
NATO’s cyber policies and strategy toward cyber-attacks.  
The scope of this thesis includes a detailed literature review, 
categorization of cyber threats from the perspective of NATO, examination of 
cyber-attacks and incidents from which NATO could take lessons for its cyber 
defense strategy, and an overview of NATO’s cyber policy evolution. It also 
provides recommendations for and evaluation of these policies. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis answers the following questions:  
1. How sufficient are the current NATO policies to respond to cyber 
threats against NATO?  
2. What are the cyber threats facing NATO?  
3. What policies has NATO implemented to fight against cyber 
operations and cyber-attacks so far?  
4. What policy recommendations can be made to respond to cyber 
threats more effectively? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Analytical and descriptive approaches are used in this thesis to answer 
the aforementioned research questions. This thesis starts with a review of the 
prevalent literature about key issues relating to cyberwar and NATO. Several 
primary and secondary resources are examined in order to get a comprehensive 
picture of the cyberwar and what NATO has done to bolster its cyber defenses. 
This thesis also explores different typologies of cyber threats and actors, and it 
offers case analyses that would concern NATO and its member countries. For 
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NATO’s cyber policy development, this thesis primarily relies on the unclassified 
information from official NATO publications, statements, and declarations, and on 
experts’ research and opinions about these policies. This thesis aims to evaluate 
the effectiveness and sufficiency of NATO’s cyber policies by considering cyber 
threats in the context of NATO’s cyber capacity and its organizational structure.  
E. OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II is a 
detailed literature review that describes a variety of topics to familiarize the 
reader with the important concepts and issues. The literature review includes the 
assessment of key cyber terms, early warning for cyberwar; traces how cyber 
issues have grown more serious over time and examines related legal 
considerations; reviews the Tallinn Manual, cyber power, and nuclear lessons; 
and discusses NATO’s position on cyber issues. 
Chapter III explores the categories of cyber threats, cyber actors as state 
actors, non-state actors, and the most active and dangerous cyber actors. After 
setting this foundation, the chapter includes a discussion of major cyber 
incidents, such as the Serbian-NATO conflict (1999), and cases involving Estonia 
(2007), Georgia (2008), Stuxnet (2010), and Ukraine (2014), to portray what 
future cyber-attacks against NATO could look like. 
By looking at the alliance’s evolution and governance in this field, Chapter 
IV describes NATO policies to fight against cyber threats. Policy evolution in the 
cyber realm covers decisions and declarations from the Prague Summit (2002), 
the Riga Summit (2006), the Bucharest Summit (2008), the Strasburg-Kehl 
Summit (2009), the Lisbon Summit (2010), the Chicago Summit (2012), the 
Wales Summit (2014), and the Warsaw Summit (2016) related to NATO’s cyber 
defense. The governance section deals with cyber defense policy updates and 
hierarchical responsibilities in governance. 
Chapter V discusses policy recommendations to respond to cyber threats 
effectively. It provides details of the Cyber Defense Pledge made at the Warsaw 
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Summit in 2016. Then, considering this pledge, it presents recommendations in 
eight specific areas: cooperation with the European Union; relations with 
business enterprises; information sharing among members; education, training, 
exercises; capabilities of NCIA; critical infrastructure protection; cyber law and 
legislature; and collective cyber defense.  
Chapter VI concludes with a summary of recommendations, presenting 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. EARLY WARNING FOR CYBERWAR 
When John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt wrote, “Cyberwar Is Coming!” in 
1993, they noted then that innovations in information technology challenged and 
changed the structural design of many institutions. Since then, hierarchies have 
eroded further, and some smaller and weaker actors have become more 
powerful. Success in war does not just depend on capital, human resources, and 
technology, but also on superior information about the battlefield (Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 1993). The authors also predicted correctly in 1993 that cyberwar might 
enable victory without the requirement of destroying an enemy force and without 
a chain of bloody combats. Under cyberwar doctrine, due to organizational and 
operational concerns, they expected a reduction in the force size in the U.S. 
military. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1993) argued that one of the earliest examples of 
cyberwar in history comes from Mongol doctrine. According to this doctrine, 
Mongols “relied for success almost entirely on learning exactly where their 
enemies were, while keeping their own whereabouts a secret until they attacked” 
(p. 148). Even though the Mongols were fewer in number, thanks to superior 
battlefield information, they were successful against China, Islam, and 
Christendom (p. 148).  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1993) predicted, “As an innovation in warfare, we 
anticipate that cyberwar may be to the twenty-first century what blitzkrieg was to 
the twentieth century. Yet, for now, we also believe that the concept is too 
speculative for precise definition” (p. 147). Almost 20 years later, Thomas Rid 
(2012) argues that “cyberwar has never happened in the past, [that] cyberwar 
does not take place in the present, and [that] it is unlikely that cyberwar will occur 
in the future” (p. 5). However, John Arquilla (2012) defends his position, stating 
that “nearly 20 years since David Ronfeldt and I introduced our concept of 
cyberwar, this new mode of conflict has become a reality. Cyberwar is here, and 
it is here to stay, despite what Thomas Rid and other skeptics think.” 
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Furthermore, John Stone (2013) also disagrees with Rid’s opinion and states that 
“cyberwar is possible in the sense that cyber-attacks could constitute acts of war” 
(p. 107).  
B.  DEFINING KEY CYBER TERMS 
In addition to arguments over whether cyberwar will take place or not, 
another issue is the definition of various concepts related to cyberwar. Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt (1993) define cyberwar as “disrupting, if not destroying, information 
and communications systems, broadly defined to include even military culture, on 
which an adversary relies in order to know itself: who it is, where it is, what it can 
do when, why it is fighting, which threats to counter first, and so forth” (p. 146). In 
the book Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, What Everyone Needs to Know, Peter W. 
Singer and Allan Friedman inform and educate an average reader about cyber 
related terms and concepts. The authors organize the book under subchapters of 
questions that a reader might have about cyber security and cyberwar. They also 
include several accounts of historical incidents, descriptive anecdotes that 
illustrate the topic. The book can be a foundational resource in the cyber area 
and provides an annotated bibliography. Singer and Friedman (2014) define 
cyberspace as “the realm of computer networks (and the users behind them) in 
which information is stored, shared, and communicated online” (p. 13). 
Chapter eight of the book, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, 
Crime, and Militancy, is written by Dorothy E. Denning, and the title of this 
chapter is “Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for 
Influencing Foreign Policy.” Denning (2001) focuses on three main types of 
activity: “activism, hacktivism, and cyberterrorism.” The first activity, activism, 
means “normal, non-disruptive use of the Internet in support of an agenda or 
cause” (p. 241). The second, hacktivism, means “the marriage of hacking and 
activism” (p. 241). It includes operations in which hacking techniques are used 
against an Internet site to disrupt normal functions without causing serious harm. 
Examples of hacktivism are “web sit-ins and virtual blockades, automated email 
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bombs, web hacks, computer break-ins, and computer viruses and worms” (p. 
241). The last activity, cyberterrorism, refers to “the convergence of cyberspace 
and terrorism” (p. 241). Hacking operations motivated by political goals and 
planned to cause “grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic damage” 
(p. 241) are considered cyberterrorism. To illustrate, cyber terrorists may 
penetrate “an air traffic control system” and cause two aircraft to collide (p. 241). 
These three activities, “activism, hacktivism, and cyberterrorism,” may affect 
foreign policy in different ways. As Denning (2001) notes,  
the Internet can be an effective tool for activism, especially when it 
is combined with other communications media. It can benefit 
individuals and small groups with few resources as well as 
organizations and coalitions that are large or well-funded. It allows 
activists in politically repressive states to evade government 
censors and monitors. With respect to hacktivism and 
cyberterrorism, those who engage in such activity are less likely to 
accomplish their foreign policy objectives than those who do not 
employ disruptive and destructive techniques. (p. 242) 
Instead of accepting the demands of hacktivists and cyber terrorists, a 
target’s primary response is possibly enhancing cyber defense policies, both at 
the national and international level (p. 242). Denning (2001) also provides 
various examples related to “activists, hacktivists, and cyber terrorists” and their 
effects on policymakers. Especially, during the Kosovo War, cyber activities of 
state and non-state actors against NATO and its members were very important 
because this was the first time NATO faced such serious cyber operations. 
In “NATO’s Cyber Defence: Strategic Challenges and Institutional 
Adaptation,” Joe Burton (2015) analyzes the theoretical and definitional problems 
regarding the cyber security field and explains the strategic challenges of the 
cyber-attacks against NATO. Burton explores the transformation of NATO’s 
cyber policies and doctrines while reviewing some actual cyber incidents that 
have occurred. The article represents a good source of information about 
NATO’s cyber policy and the challenges that it faces in this domain. Burton 
(2015) divides cyber security issues into four categories: cybercrime, cyber 
 10 
espionage, cyberterrorism, and cyber warfare. He defines cyber security as 
“being secure from cyber-attacks and efforts to disrupt, delay, or destroy 
computer networks, and cyber exploitation efforts to covertly obtain information 
from computer networks” (p. 299). Cybercrime is an act “carried out by private 
individuals or groups, directed against private individuals and businesses, and 
take the form of identity theft and financial fraud” (p. 299). The main incentive 
behind cybercrime is financial gain. Cyber espionage is an activity that “involves 
state controlled or directed cyber attackers targeting private businesses and 
foreign governments in order to steal sensitive information for commercial, 
political and military gain” (p. 300). Cybercrime differs from cyber espionage, 
because in cybercrime private groups or individuals are conducting the act, while 
in cyber espionage states or entities acting on behalf of states are conducting 
these activities. Edward V. Linden (2007) references Denning’s definition of 
cyberterrorism as “unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, 
networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a 
government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives” (p. 71). 
Finally, cyber warfare is defined as “an armed conflict conducted in whole or part 
by cyber means, and military operations conducted to deny an opposing force 
the effective use of cyberspace systems and weapons in a conflict” (Cartwright, 
2010, p. 8). 
C. CYBER ISSUES BECOMING MORE SERIOUS 
Richard A. Clarke and Robert Knake (2010) walk the reader through the 
fundamentals and mechanics of cyberwar in their book, Cyber War. The authors 
also talk about some of the actors and countries who could engage in cyberwar 
such as Russia and China and give some technical information about their 
capabilities. The book, which lacks references and footnotes, gives the 
impression that it offers unsupported opinions. However, the authors try to 
support their claims with their arguments depending on their experiences. Clarke 
and Knake (2010) state some of the significant features of cyberwar. They 
consider cyberwar to be real, because there have been several incidents that 
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targeted some nation’s critical elements. Second, cyberwar’s speed is as fast as 
the speed of light; for this reason, the time between the effect of a cyber-attack 
and its launch is very hard to measure. Third, cyberwar is global: attackers’ 
capabilities are beyond regional limitations, because information technologies 
make cyberspace global. Fourth, cyberwar skips traditional battlefields, because 
there is no need to eliminate an adversary’s traditional defense systems before 
executing a cyber-attack. Finally, cyberwar has begun, because many nations 
are already preparing for cyberwar to defend their cyberspace and deter their 
enemies (Clarke & Knake, 2010).  
Salih Bicakci (2014) deals with various cyber issues such as the first self-
replicating software in ARPANET, creeper, and the solution to this worm, reaper. 
The first worm was a sign for future cyber-attacks, and in 2010, the Stuxnet 
attack showed that worms can stay dormant and may not cause any harm until 
they achieve their goals (p.124). However, each cyber-attack teaches target 
countries to defend their systems better. After Stuxnet, Iran started to build its 
own intranet to limit Internet connections among critical facilities (p. 108). On the 
other hand, Bicakci provides an example from Egypt during the Arab Spring to 
show the power of the Internet. Hosni Mubarak, the former president, temporarily 
blocked access to Twitter, Facebook, and Blackberry to prevent activists from 
exploiting Internet connectivity to support their social movement in the country 
(Bicakci, 2014). The author also mentions the emergence of the World Wide Web 
(www), as well as of hackers (Bicakci, 2014, p. 115). 
According to Singer and Friedman (2014), the number of governments 
preparing to fight cyberwar in the world is more than 100. In the business sector, 
97 percent of the companies on the Fortune 500 list have been hacked. National 
Security Agency monitoring, the WikiLeaks scandals, and unprecedented cyber 
weapons like Stuxnet suggest the significance of cyber security. President 
Barack Obama has stated that “cyber security risks pose some of the most 
serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century” (Deibert, 
2011, p. 2). 
 12 
D. CYBERWAR IS REAL 
In 2013, John Arquilla published “Twenty Years of Cyber War,” in which 
he not only asserts that cyberwar is real, but also focuses on the ethical side of 
the issue. Arquilla (2013) notes that his and Ronfeldt’s 1993 prediction about 
communication systems, sensors, and weapon systems has become true, and 
they are crucial for armed forces. However, the negative side of this development 
is, if systems are disrupted, heavy reliance upon them would imperil the forces in 
operations. Arquilla (2013) states, “the dominant response to our notion that 
cyberwar was coming soon was ‘No, it’s not.’ Twenty years on, the tide has 
clearly turned, with only a few hold-outs taking the view that there is less than 
meets the eye to cyberwar” (p. 81). Cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 and in 
the Russian-Georgian war, which was supported by skillful hacker attacks in 
2008, have made it difficult to deny the existence of cyberwar. Furthermore, in 
2010, the Stuxnet malicious worm caused physical damage to Iran’s nuclear 
centrifuges. This event showed that binary codes could cause destruction in the 
real world. Despite speculation, no official proof connects these attacks to 
Russia, Israel, and the United States; however, it is apparent that cyberwar is 
real (Arquilla, 2013).  
Arquilla (2013) raises several ethical questions such as “Can one retaliate 
justly without knowing the identity of the guilty party?”; “Does the principle of 
proportionality require an in-kind cyber-response to a cyber- attack?”; or “Can a 
more physical response be allowed, even a declaration of war followed by 
military operations?” (pp. 81–82). Answers to these questions are not very clear. 
Ethically, the attacker’s intent is very important, and if the aim is to cause severe 
disruption, then a type of military reaction could be legitimate. Yet, the execution 
of cyber techniques may limit long, bloody, unethical conflicts (Arquilla, 2013). 
E. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Oona Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, Aileen 
Nowlan, William Perdue, and Julia Spiegel (2012) offer a comprehensive 
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discussion about the legal issues related to cyber-attacks in their article “The Law 
of Cyber Attack.” The authors initially define and analyze the terminology of 
cyber-attack and identify the different types of cyber-attacks. They then explain 
the legal principles of war, namely jus ad bellum and jus in bello,1 and tie these 
principles to cyber warfare. They also explore the international legal regimes 
such as the United Nations, NATO, and Council of Europe that regulate cyber-
attacks directly, and other international legal regimes like telecommunications 
law, aviation law, and law of space that indirectly regulate cyber-attacks. The 
article answers several questions that a reader might have in the area of law of 
cyber-attacks. 
Hathaway et al. (2012) state that cyber-attacks are capable of threatening 
national security by damaging air defense systems, nuclear power plants and 
centrifuges, and power grids. Since some consequences of cyber-attacks could 
be as disruptive as armed attacks, the question of how existing law could be 
applied to respond to possible cyber threats is very significant. Due to the 
uniqueness of cyber threats, Hathaway et al. (2012) propose that there must be 
legal reform on both international and domestic levels besides filling the gaps in 
the existing law. The legal framework needs to be sufficient for responding to 
new and growing cyber threats. However, because cyber-attacks are often 
perpetrated by actors who have transnational roots, domestic law alone is 
insufficient. Therefore, international cooperation is essential in preparing the 
international legal framework for fighting against cyber threats (Hathaway et al., 
2012).   
In the article “In Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar,” 
Charles Dunlap (2011) focuses on the legal issues that a cyber strategist needs 
to consider when dealing with cyber-attacks. Dunlap draws a comparison 
between a cyber-attack and a conventional attack from the Law of Armed 
                                            
1 Jus ad bellum means the right to go to war, and jus in bello means right conduct within war. 
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Conflict’s perspective. The article makes an appreciable contribution to the 
reader’s knowledge about the legal issues in the cyber domain.    
Dunlap (2011) states that there is an urgent requirement for a new legal 
regime covering cyberwar issues. Traditional arms control agreements are not 
sufficient in deterring attackers in the cyber domain due to the complexity of the 
attribution problem (Dunlap, 2011). In addition, if there were an international 
cyber treaty, every nation would have different expectations for it, and each 
nation would perceive its objectives in its own way. The United States declared 
that “existing international law could theoretically be applied to cyber conflict and 
that the United States would support the establishment of ‘norms of behavior’ 
that like-minded states could agree to follow in cyberspace” (Dunlap, 2011, p. 
83). Response to a cyber-attack depends on the severity of the attack. Cyber-
attacks can be legally equivalent to armed attacks only when their consequences 
are as violent as an armed attack (Dunlap, 2011). However, evaluating the 
damage of a cyber-attack and assessing its disruption is not a simple task. There 
can be controversial issues associated with this assessment when it comes to 
tracking the perpetrator. Nevertheless, even when a cyber incident is equivalent 
to an armed attack, which justifies the use of force against the adversary for self-
defense, it does not automatically create an armed conflict or a state of war 
(Dunlap, 2011).  
F. TALLINN MANUAL 
According to the Tallinn Manual (2013), cyber operations started to draw 
attention in the late 1990s. Notably, in 1999, the United States Naval War 
College assembled the first large-scale legal conference on this topic. Later, “the 
massive cyber operations by ‘hacktivists’ against Estonia in 2007 and against 
Georgia during its war with the Russian Federation in 2008, as well as cyber 
incidents like the targeting of the Iranian nuclear facilities with the Stuxnet worm 
in 2010” diverted more attention to cyber operations (Schmitt, 2013, p. 16). Ken 
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Jones (2015) analyzes the Tallinn Manual and NATO in his thesis, “Cyber War: 
The Next Frontier for NATO.” Jones notes that 
the Tallinn Manual, prepared by the Cooperative Cyber Defense 
Center of Excellence and published by Cambridge University 
Press, is an attempt to apply customary international law to 
generate legal principles for the developing field of cyber warfare. 
The Cyber Defense Center is an International Military Organization 
accredited by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s top political 
decision-making arm. The Tallinn Manual, though written by a 
panel of experts on international law, does not hold legal authority. 
Nevertheless, it can be used to help guide a response following a 
cyber-attack on a member nation. (pp. 19, 20) 
The Tallinn Manual’s Part A (International Cyber Security Law), Chapter II 
(The Use of Force), Section 2 includes rules specifically related to self-defense, 
namely rules 13 through 17 (Schmitt, 2013). Jones (2015) summarizes these 
rules: Rule 13, “Self-Defense Against Armed Attack,” deals with the right that all 
countries have to guard themselves when a cyber-attack occurs. Rule 13 also 
includes “the scale and effect of the attack.” In Rules 14 and 15, the Tallinn 
Manual shows that the “right to use force in self-defense” relies on “necessity, 
proportionality, imminence, and immediacy.” Rule 16 in the manual focuses on 
collective self-defense, restating the need for “necessity, proportionality, 
imminence, and immediacy.” Rule 17 invokes the United Nations (UN) Charter 
Article 51. If a cyber-attack is ongoing or has already taken place, the United 
Nations Security Council should be informed immediately about “the violation of 
Article 51” (pp. 20–25). 
Following the Tallinn Manual guidance, if the cyber-attack just collected 
intelligence information, or enabled cyber theft, defining such an attack as an 
armed attack would not be appropriate. Concepts and rules in the Tallinn Manual 
are generally stated in the abstract terms, because it tries to build an ethical and 
comprehensive approach for cyber conflict. According to Jones (2015), “The 
Tallinn Manual uses expert opinion and imagined scenarios in its development of 
rules, which have yet to be applied in any serious ‘real-life’ scenario as it relates 
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to a cyber-attack. However, the publication of the Tallinn Manual is a step 
forward in cyber defense” (p. 25). 
G. CYBER POWER AND NUCLEAR LESSONS 
In his paper “Cyber Power,” Joseph Nye (2010) discusses how the 
concept of power can be applied to cyberspace. Nye (2010) argues that the 
diffusion of power differs in cyberspace from other domains of warfare. He walks 
the reader through the concepts of power, the cyber power reality, actors in 
cyberspace, and the roles of government in this new domain. The article is very 
informative about the relationship between the power concept and cyberspace.  
Nye (2010) stated that the effects of cyber power vary from commerce to 
war, with a very wide range of effects. Competition among individuals, 
corporations, and governments is not a new phenomenon, but the factors of 
anonymity, entry with a low price, and ability to create asymmetric threats let 
smaller actors achieve significant objectives in cyberspace by exercising soft and 
hard power that is very hard to do in the other domains of warfare with such 
limited resources (Nye, 2010). Therefore, the differentials of power among actors 
are reduced due to the characteristics of cyberspace, and this represents an 
example of the diffusion of power in world politics. The biggest powers are not 
able to dominate the cyber domain completely as much as they do in the other 
domains of warfare like sea, air, or space. Nye (2010) claims that although 
cyberspace enables some power shifts among the strong and weak states with 
the opportunity stated previously, the likelihood of these power transitions being 
a game changer in international politics is very small.  
In another article, “Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security,” Nye (2011) raises 
an important question, “Can the nuclear revolution in military affairs seven decades 
ago teach us anything about the current cyber transformation?” (p. 22). He makes 
a useful comparison between cyber and nuclear technology. This article is very 
helpful for making an analogy between these two very different technologies. It 
also provides significant lessons from the nuclear strategies in the past. 
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Nye (2011) states that there are significant technological differences 
between nuclear and cyber capabilities. For instance, while nuclear explosions 
are unambiguous, cyber intrusions can be unnoticeable for a long time. The 
destruction level of nuclear technology is enormous, while cyber-attacks do not 
pose such a catastrophic threat. Nye (2011) argues that the results of a nuclear 
war could take the world back to the Stone Age, while a big cyberwar at most 
could take a country to the economic level of 1990s.  
Despite these differences, Nye (2011) argues that several nuclear lessons 
can be learned and applied to the cyber domain. The general lessons he 
explains in his article are that “continuing technological change [will] complicate 
early efforts at strategy” (p. 23); “strategy for a new technology will lack adequate 
empirical content” (p. 25); “new technologies raise new issues in civil-military 
relations” (p. 26); “civilian uses will complicate effective national security 
strategies” (p. 27); “learning can lead to concurrence in beliefs without 
cooperation” (p. 29); “learning is often lumpy and discontinuous” (p. 30); “learning 
occurs at different rates in different issues of a new domain” (p. 31); “military in 
international contacts [should be involved]” (p. 32); “deterrence is complex and 
involves more than just retaliation” (p. 33); and “arms control with positive-sum 
games related to third parties [should be started]” (p. 34). To sum up, these 
lessons represent a useful guideline when making an analogy between nuclear 
and cyber technologies. 
H. CYBERWAR AND NATO 
In the article, “NATO’s Emerging Threat Perception: Cyber Security in the 
21st Century,” Bicakci (2014) argues that the “Westphalian state system has 
been deeply affected from the civilianization of the cyber space.” The legacy of 
nuclear war competition is apparent in the post-Cold War period. Nowadays, 
threats in cyberspace and their ambiguous boundaries can be observed in recent 
cyber cases. The latest cyber-attacks against NATO and its member states show 
that cyber will be a crucial issue in the future. The author also discusses the 
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kinds of defensive measures and strategies that NATO has implemented to meet 
these new cyber threats. NATO’s first step for a cyber defense strategy is to 
increase the level the cyber capabilities of allied countries (p. 101). 
Jason Andress and Steve Winterfeld have written Cyber Warfare, a 
comprehensive book that provides substantial information on cyber issues. This 
book covers not only strategic, but also operational and tactical approaches to 
current conflicts in cyberspace. The design of the book helps anyone understand 
the necessary parts of recent developments, besides providing strong 
background information. The book uniquely presents the information in a way 
that can be utilized “to establish a strategic cyber security vision for an 
organization” (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. xiii). On the other hand, it also 
contributes to the national debate on the future of cyber. A variety of individuals 
or groups, including policy makers and security professionals, can benefit from 
this resource, because the concepts are helpful to determine the allocation of 
resources and implementation of security projects and policies (p. xiii). 
Andress and Winterfeld (2014) have designed the book in a way that 
readers can read chapters separately. The first chapter deals with what cyber 
warfare is and its different aspects compared to conventional warfare. Chapter 2 
is related to cyber threats, especially attackers’ methods, tools, and techniques. 
The authors mention cyber as the fifth domain of war in Chapter 3, and current 
cyber warfare doctrine for militaries, states, and organizations in Chapter 4. The 
fifth chapter focuses on present and future cyber warriors in terms of their 
education, training, certifications, and so forth. Logical, physical, and psychological 
weapons are covered in Chapters 6 through 9, and computer network attacks and 
defense are the main focus of Chapters 10 and 11. In addition to state actors, non-
state actors are also active in the cyber domain. Chapter 12 discusses 
corporations engaged in cyberwar, cyber terrorists, cyber-criminal groups, and 
autonomous cyber actors. Finally, Chapter 16 covers the future of cyberwar, “the 
most likely and most dangerous course of action for conflicts in the cyber domain,” 
and what should be done through international relations (p. xvii). 
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Andress and Winterfeld (2014) argue that “organizations like NATO have 
very active cyber communities” (p. 10). The Cooperative Cyber Defense Center 
of Excellence (CCDCOE) located in Tallinn, Estonia, was officially founded on 
the May 14, 2008, to develop NATO’s cyber defense capacities (p. 68). The 
appendix of the book provides a “Cyber Timeline,” which includes the major 
cyber events until 2013. The events directly related to NATO are the 1999 
Serbian hackers’ attack on NATO systems during NATO’s military operations in 
Kosovo; the 2007 Estonian attacks, in which hackers were linked to the Russian 
government; and the 2008 cyber-attacks against Georgia, which applied for 
membership to NATO previously, during the military engagement with Russia 
(pp. 293, 294). 
In “International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations,” Eneken Tikk, 
Kaska Kadri, and Vihul Liis (2010) analyze four cases in the years between 2007 
and 2008. The Estonia Case in 2007, the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Case 
in 2008, the Lithuania Case in 2008, and the Georgia Case in 2008. The authors 
give details for each case, including background of the incident, facts of the case, 
and legal considerations about the case. The authors also make an evaluation of 
these cases at the end and provide their observations and recommendations for 
the readers.  
Tikk et al. (2010) state that reliance on information technologies makes 
organizations vulnerable to cyber threats. These incidents have shown that most 
of the countries lack adequate legal frameworks to cope with this kind of threat. 
They also demonstrated how easy it is to launch cyber-attacks, and how complex 
the challenge is to defend the networks and infrastructures of an organization 
due to the rapid developments in this field. These incidents have also exposed 
the need for change in cyber strategy. Adequately addressing real cyber 
incidents is beyond most states’ preparation level (Tikk et al., 2010). In addition 
to providing important takeaways from these incidents in the conclusion, the 




Overall, the presence of cyberwar is undeniable, and every country has to 
take action to address threats in the cyber realm. This problem is not simple 
enough to be addressed entirely within national boundaries; the reality of the 
cyber domain stands as a transnational phenomenon. NATO plays a significant 
role in this transnational environment with its collective defense strategy. The 
cyber incidents against NATO and its member countries have opened up a new 
frontier for NATO. The organization has been trying to adapt to these changes by 
taking some measures, such as implementing new strategies and policies 
against cyber threats, and establishing new institutions like NATO CCDCOE. 
However, more research must address the sufficiency of NATO’s cyber policies 
to defend itself and its member countries against cyber threats.  
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III. THE CYBER THREATS AGAINST NATO 
Threats in the cyber domain and the abilities of cyber actors are evolving 
rapidly because of unprecedented technological advances. Like every individual 
state, NATO as a collective defense alliance must also be vigilant about the 
threats and actors in the cyber realm. In this chapter, the cyber threats against 
NATO are discussed by analyzing cyber threat categories, cyber actors, and 
cyber incidents related to NATO’s security in the cyber domain.  
A. CYBER THREATS 
Defining and categorizing cyber threats is a challenge due to their 
complexity and variety. In this section, cyber threats are classified and discussed 
under the four categories of cybercrime, cyber espionage, cyberterrorism, and 
cyber warfare.  
1. Introduction 
In 2010, President Barack Obama stated that “it is now clear this cyber 
threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we 
face as a nation, and we are not as prepared as we should be, as a government 
or as a country.” As governments and economies have become too dependent 
on Internet and digital infrastructures, they have become a valuable target for 
adversaries (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014). Denning (2007) also observe that an 
increasing number of criminals, spies, hackers and others who have found 
benefit in damaging and exploiting computer networks have been targeting them. 
Several critical infrastructures are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as nuclear 
power plants, transportation infrastructures, healthcare, emergency services, 
dams, banking and finance, communications, agriculture, chemical, and defense 
infrastructures (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014).  
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2. Categories of Cyber Threats 
Conceptual and definitional challenges are associated with the cyber 
realm that scholars have been trying to overcome since the beginning of the 
cyber era. The fundamental terminology about cyber and categories of cyber 
threats are the subject of debate. The UN defines cyber as “the global system of 
systems of Internetted computers, communications infrastructures, online 
conferencing entities, databases and information utilities generally known as the 
Net” (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. 4). The United States Department of 
Defense defines cyberspace as the “notional environment in which digitized 
information is communicated over computer networks” (Andress & Winterfeld, 
2014, p. 3). To analyze cyber threats from the perspective of NATO requires a 
classification framework for these threats. As Burton (2015) put it, cyber threats 
can be classified into four main categories. These categories are cybercrime, 
cyber espionage, cyberterrorism, and cyber warfare.  
(1) Cybercrime 
Cybercrime can be defined as a “crime enabled by or that targets 
computers” (Alexander, 2014, p. 2). These criminal activities can be carried out 
by individuals or groups who have diverse goals such as financial gain, identity 
theft, and damaging property. Most cybercrime is financially motivated and incurs 
economic costs. According to Steve Morgan (2016), the global cost of 
cybercrimes to business increased to $500 billion per year, and this number 
quadrupled from 2013 to 2015. Morgan (2016) also predicts that the cost of 
cybercrimes and data breaches could reach $2.1 trillion a year globally by 2019. 
Although cybercrime is not regarded as a military threat, the increase in 
organized cybercrime represents an important threat to the security of NATO 
member countries (Burton, 2015).  
(2) Cyber Espionage 
Cyber espionage can be defined as “the use of computer systems or 
information technology to illegally obtain confidential/secret information from the 
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government, private sector, or some other entity” (Alexander, 2014, p. 2). Cyber 
espionage activities are conducted by cyber attackers directed or controlled by 
states for the purpose of providing required knowledge to the states to obtain 
political, commercial, and military gain (Burton, 2015). Since cybercrimes are 
conducted by groups or private individuals, cyber espionage differs from 
cybercrime in terms of its perpetrators (Burton, 2015). Espionage activities have 
existed in the international system for ages, but new information technologies 
have introduced an unprecedented capability and ease to this field. Alexander 
Klimburg (2011) points out that the Pentagon lost 25 to 27 terabytes of data in 
2007, which is equivalent to 5,000 DVDs of digital information. Cyber espionage 
can be conducted by any motivated state actor with sufficient cyber-attack 
capabilities. Therefore, states have never been this vulnerable to espionage at 
any time in history.  
(3) Cyberterrorism 
In 2001, Denning defined cyberterrorism as “the convergence of 
cyberspace and terrorism” (p. 241) that “covers politically motivated hacking 
operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic 
damage” (p. 241). There is also a continuing debate on defining cyberterrorism 
just like the arguments on definitions of terrorism itself. Dean C. Alexander 
(2014) defines cyberterrorism as “unlawful attacks and threats of attack against 
computers, networks, and information stored therein—carried out through the 
computers, Internet, or the use of flash drive storage devices—when done to 
intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social 
objectives” (Alexander, 2014, p. 3).  
Burton (2015) describes two conditions that need to be fulfilled to count a 
cyber-attack as cyberterrorism: first, “its effects should be comparable to terrorist 
attacks” (p. 300); second, “the intent should be coercing political change” (p. 
300). The main difference between cyber-attacks and cyberterrorism is the 
motives behind these activities. Cyber-attacks are carried out because of 
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financial and other (political) aims, but the motives for cyberterrorism are mostly 
political, religious, or social (Alexander, 2014). Cyber-attacks can be utilized by 
terrorist groups owing to their convenience, flexibility, and low cost. The 
attribution problem also can serve as an advantage for the terrorist groups. The 
consequences of cyber terrorist activities can be very damaging to a state’s 
assets. Therefore, this field represents a critical area for the national security of 
the states. 
(4) Cyber Warfare 
Cyberspace is regarded as the fifth domain of warfare after land, sea, air, 
and space by many states. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 
announced in June 2016 that “the 28-member alliance has agreed to declare 
cyber an operational domain, much as the sea, air and land are” (Clark, 2016). 
Andreas Hagen (2013) stated this breakthrough as follows: “warfare has reached 
a new frontier. Over the past several years and even decades, it has been 
accumulating to this point where war is not only fought with bombs and guns 
anymore but also with bits and bytes” (p. 1).  
Introducing a new battlefield to the defense organizations brings up 
several issues related to cyber warfare. Like other fundamental terminology in 
this field, cyber warfare is also defined in various ways by scholars. One 
definition of cyber warfare can be “utilizing computers and other instruments to 
target an enemy’s information systems rather than attacking an enemy’s armies 
or factories” (Alexander, 2014, p. 4). The use of cyber power in military 
operations would definitely serve as a huge force multiplier in contemporary 
military doctrines. Since the armed forces are highly dependent on information 
technologies and computer networks, disruption of these systems would provide 
great advantages to the adversary. Therefore, defending national defense 
systems from cyber-attacks in terms of cyber warfare is very critical for states. 
One of the most prominent examples of cyber warfare was observed during the 
Russo-Georgia War in 2008 (Hagen, 2013). Experts claimed that the Georgian 
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government got cyber-locked after Russian cyber-attacks gave Russia a strategic 
advantage for its continuing military operations (Korns & Kastenberg, 2008).  
NATO’s involvement in each of these cyber threat categories is debatable. 
Although NATO’s mission might not be to define and classify everything in 
cyberspace, “it is the alliance’s role to prevent crises, manage conflicts, and 
defend one another against attacks, including against new threats – none of 
which can be conducted with vague directions and abstruse concepts” (Laasme, 
2011, p. 61). Burton (2015) identifies the core and peripheral role of NATO in four 
categories of cyber threats. First of all, he argues that since NATO is not a police 
organization or a justice institute to fight crimes, civil and legal responses would 
be a better solution to fight cybercrimes, and the role of NATO in this area may 
be inappropriate. Second, he states that NATO’s role in cyber espionage might 
be both necessary and appropriate due to the critical and confidential information 
that it keeps in its own networks. If this information were exfiltrated from its 
systems, this breach would damage the security of all of the alliance, and this 
information could be used against member countries. Third, after 9/11 NATO 
invoked Article 5 for the first time; this showed its determination to fight against 
terrorist organizations and activities. Since, cyberterrorism is just a variant of 
terrorism in general, NATO has a natural stake in fighting cyberterrorism. Finally, 
Burton (2015) points out that cyber warfare is an evolving domain that NATO 
cannot disregard. To meet its collective defense goals, NATO must defend its 
alliance in this frontier.  
B. CYBER ACTORS 
The Internet provides great power to its users through global 
interconnected networks. Since national and international laws for the Internet 
are very limited, some non-state actors have freely acquired cyber power, and 
they can even threaten states’ activities in cyberspace (Czosseck, 2013). In 
cyberspace, borders and sovereignty of states are controversial. Electrons do not 
have passports or visas, and malicious packets can be blocked only when they 
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are detected. Potentially severe cyber-attacks are not detectable because these 
attacks do not require planners to prepare great logistic support. Denning (2001) 
observes, “They can be invisibly reconnoitered, clandestinely rehearsed, and 
then mounted in a matter of minutes or even seconds without revealing the 
identity and location of the attacker” (p. 285). The nature of cyberspace forces us 
to face an undesirable fact that experienced and wary cyber actors such as 
individuals, groups, or states, can operate malicious attacks from anywhere in 
the world, with a low possibility of being detected (Czosseck, 2013). In this 
section, cyber actors are discussed under two categories, state actors and non-
state actors.  
1. State Actors 
According to Scott Jasper (2015), the most remarkable and publicly known 
actors are “groups of attackers categorized as an advanced persistent threat” 
(APT) (p. 62). “APT hacking is designed to covertly penetrate networks and 
systems to steal or alter information, manipulate data, or cause damage” (p. 62). 
These groups can be military units or some other related groups who get support 
from national governments (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. 46).  
Cyber power is crucial at the deterrence level of countries; however, it is 
difficult to determine which countries are stronger in cyberspace than others. 
Furthermore, classifying state actors as threats against NATO is also challenging 
because of the attribution problem. In order to differentiate the cyber power level 
of countries, cyber offense and defense capabilities can be compared. The level 
of a state’s dependence on cyberspace is also important because it directly 
relates to the vulnerability of that state. However, without adequate information 
about countries, it is almost impossible to compare them. Clark and Knake 
compare the “cyberwar strength of the U.S., Russia, China, Iran, and North 
Korea” (Clarke & Knake, 2010, p. 148). In order to rank all countries or at least to 
compare some of them, they should provide all cyber related information; 
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nevertheless, the information-sharing level will never reach that point for 
apparent reasons.  
Aside from cyber power considerations, focusing on the activities of states 
in cyberspace, these activities can be divided into three main categories, which 
are law enforcement, intelligence services, and armed forces (Czosseck, 2013). 
However, law enforcement bodies conceptually cannot be considered a threat to 
NATO, because their fundamental goal is to ensure domestic security by 
enforcing laws or keeping citizens away from crime in cyberspace. This leaves 
intelligence services and armed forces as potential cyber threats from states. 
(1) Intelligence Services  
Espionage among nations is an internationally accepted and common 
practice. Even though this act is generally outlawed by the legal systems of 
countries, it has become a traditional activity. With the international development 
in information and communication technology, intelligence agencies benefit from 
new ways to reach their targets. Relatively safe and globally accessed espionage 
activities via the Internet have led many nations to develop capabilities to 
conduct operations in cyberspace. States can broadly spy on the Internet by 
focusing on activities of interest via cyber tools (Czosseck, 2013). 
(2) Armed Forces  
Although some countries officially recognize cyberspace as the fifth 
warfare domain, others prefer not to do so. However, without hesitation, almost 
all countries are under pressure to enhance cyber military capabilities to fight 
against cyber actors. Many scholars compare and find similarities between 
current developments in cyberspace and past cases of traditional arms races. 
These are strong signs of another race starting among countries (Jellenc, 2012; 
Czosseck, 2013). 
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2. Non-state Actors 
Almost 25 years ago, scholars were saying that non-state actors in 
cyberspace should also be treated as opponents. Activities of these actors do not 
recognize national boundaries (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993). “Non-state actors, 
logically, are those that take actions of a cyber nature, but are not directly part of 
a nation-state” (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. 207). In the literature, scholars 
define and classify non-state actors divergently. According to Christian Czosseck 
(2013), 
hackers, (organised) cyber criminals, hacktivists and, to a disputed 
extent, cyber terrorists, have emerged over time. To make a clear-
cut distinction between them is, in many cases, futile, as globally 
different definitions, legal frameworks and, more often than not, 
political agendas lead to different assessments of the same action. 
(p. 3) 
One of the most famous words related to cyber actors is “hacker,” which 
has become a universal word in cyber terms. However, due to this popularity, 
people tend to mistakenly call all cyber actors hackers. Czosseck (2013) 
provides distinct definitions as follows: “hackers without a malicious intent are 
referred to as white hats or ethical hackers” (p. 5); “grey hats … often want to 
support the wider community, making cyberspace more secure by using their 
skills against wrong-doers” (p. 5); and “others use such knowledge to blackmail 
their victims, which leads into the last subculture of hackers introduced here, 
often referred to as black hats” (p. 6). 
Andress and Winterfeld (2014) provide a more comprehensive 
classification in their book, Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for 
Security Practitioners, for non-state actors in cyberspace. The terms used to 
describe individuals or groups who are considered as non-state actors are “rather 
arbitrary and tend to vary wildly from one source to another” (Andress & 
Winterfeld, 2014, p. 208). 
Six different terms related to non-state actors and their alternatives are 
presented by the authors. The terms are “script kiddies, malware authors, 
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scammers, blackhats, hacktivists, and patriot hackers” (Andress & Winterfeld, 
2014, p. 209). Script kiddies have the lowest level of skills, but they are the most 
common ones. “Script kiddies generally use scripts and tools that have been 
written by others in order to conduct their attacks, but have no great skill or ability 
beyond the use of such tools” (p. 209).  
Malware authors, who may be employed by states and organized crime 
groups, can compile “original items of malware, [but] some certain amount of skill 
at programming and knowledge of the target operating systems is required” (p. 
209). Scammers are often treated as the lowest of the low among attackers (p. 
209), and blackhats are “the bad guys of the hacker world. Such hackers often 
have no particular care for the rule of law, the systems that they disrupt, or what 
ill effects they cause” (p. 210). 
Hacktivists act primarily for political reasons, and they “tend to select 
targets with high visibility which they see as appropriate to deliver the intended 
political message” (Czosseck, 2013, p. 7). Hacktivists’ tools are “website 
defacement, mass emailing, Denial of Service (DoS) or Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks, Domain Name Service (DNS) hijacking, or any of a 
number of other methods” (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. 211). Patriotic hackers 
can also be considered as hacktivists; however, they generally deal with national 
conflicts and “can even join into cyberwars as independent players” (p. 211).  
Having identified the six different terms related to non-state actors, we 
consider the four categories of non-state actors who can threaten NATO.   
(1) Individual Actors 
Individual attackers “range greatly in skill level, from the lowliest script 
kiddie who can only run automated tools,” to the most skilled hackers, “who can 
penetrate a system with disturbing ease and leave no trace for the owners of the 
system to detect” (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. 208). 
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(2) Corporations 
Giant corporations can be “possessors of great power and resources, 
often rivaling those of small countries” (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. 211). 
Corporations, especially, “in the technical industry are often well organized, 
staffed with highly trained employees, and have access to the latest technologies 
and equipment, including those with which cyber warfare can be carried out” (p. 
211). Refraining from criminal activities, business people and politicians are the 
practitioners of traditional organized commercial and industrial espionage, which 
dates back to the 14th century (p. 211). 
(3) Cyber Terrorists 
Cyber terrorists are an emotionally motivated category of attackers, and 
they are related to “both hacktivists and patriotic hackers, differing largely in both 
the scale and the intensity of their actions” (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. 212). 
A cyber terrorist may disrupt “banks, international financial transactions, and 
stock exchanges” (Denning, 2001, p. 282). Following such disruptions, economic 
systems may stop, the public may lose confidence, and destabilization can be 
achieved (p. 282). 
(4) Organized Cybercrime Actors 
The attribution problem, lack of cyber related laws, and the cross-border 
feature of cybercrime have encouraged the formation of organized cybercrime 
groups that operate globally (Czosseck, 2013). One of the most famous 
international cybercrime organizations was the Russian Business Network, which 
was the only cybercrime organization recognized as a primary threat by NATO in 
2009 (Daily Beast, 2009; Czosseck, 2013). Recently, “organized cyber criminals 
have begun to target the organizations where large amounts of such data 
[personal and exploitable information] are warehoused, often credit card 
processing centers and other financial institutions” (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, 
p. 215). 
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3. Most Active and Dangerous Cyber Actors 
Analysis of war requires a deep “understanding of the enemy forces and 
their composition, disposition, strength, centers of gravity, and terrain…. [T]his 
was true under Sun Tzu, Napoleon Bonaparte, Alexander the Great, and still [is] 
today” (Andress & Winterfeld, 2014, p. 45). In the cyber battlefield, various actors 
operate, and they cause different levels of damage to their targets. Script kiddies 
are the most active threat in terms of amount of activity (p. 45). In addition to the 
activity level of cyber actors, it is crucial to determine the level of impact or damage 
that threat actors can cause. The threat that results in the greatest impact and 
damage is the APT, which generally originates from nation states (p. 46).  
After evaluating cyber threats and actors that operate in cyberspace, we 
are left with one question: Have we have seen a cyberwar or not? So far, no 
state actor has officially declared a war in cyberspace, but a series of serious 
cyber-attacks were conducted against Estonia in 2007. In 2008, Georgia suffered 
from coordinated cyber and kinetic attacks. These kinds of cyber incidents 
directly involve nation states and may require military action (Andress & 
Winterfeld, 2014, p. 10). Estonia is a NATO member country, and Georgia is a 
candidate state for NATO alliance. Many other cyber incidents have had a direct 
or indirect effect on NATO, and to better understand cyber threats and actors, we 
should study and scrutinize these cyber cases. 
C. CYBER INCIDENTS AND CASES 
Cyber threats against NATO can be understood by analyzing recent major 
cyber incidents. These incidents give an idea about how future cyber-attacks 
might be executed against NATO and its member countries. Would any of these 
incidents call for a NATO response if conducted against a NATO member? This 
question needs to be kept in mind when examining the following cases. In this 
section, the 1999 Serbian-NATO conflict, 2007 Estonia case, 2008 Georgia case, 
2010 Stuxnet case, 2014 Ukraine case, and other cyber incidents are discussed.  
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1. Serbian-NATO Conflict (1999) 
As an international actor, in 1999, NATO warned its members about 
attacks to their communication systems and wanted members to be ready for 
such attacks (Bicakci, 2014). However, the first cyber-attacks occurred earlier 
than expected. When NATO forces began bombing Serbian targets, unexpected 
cyber-attacks started. Hackers mostly preferred DDoS attacks to disable the 
military communication systems of NATO and its member states (Bicakci, 2014). 
Denning (2001) notes in the book chapter, “Activism, Hacktivism, and 
Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy,” that the 
Kosovo conflict has been interpreted as the first Internet war. She concludes that 
“government and nongovernment actors alike used the Net to disseminate 
information, spread propaganda, demonize opponents, and solicit support for 
their positions” (Denning, 2001, p. 239).  
Denning (2001) provides examples of activism and hacktivism during the 
Serbian-NATO Conflict. She emphasizes actions by non-state actors, yet state 
activities “are discussed where they reflect foreign policy decisions triggered by 
the Internet” (Denning, 2001, p. 241). Publication, coordination of action, and 
lobbying decision makers are examples of activist operations; however, focusing 
on hacktivist activities against NATO will be a better approach to understand 
cyber threats to the alliance. As mentioned previously in brief, there are four 
types of hacktivist activities: “virtual sit-ins and blockades [DDoS attacks], 
automated email bombs, web hacks and computer break-ins, and computer 
viruses and worms” (Denning, 2001, p. 263). These activities are detailed here. 
(1) DDoS Attacks 
DDoS attacks in cyberspace are similar to the physical version of sit-ins or 
blockades (Denning, 2001). The aim of these attacks is to draw “attention to the 
protestors and their cause by disrupting normal operations and blocking access 
to facilities” (p. 264). For example, “Belgrade hackers bombarded NATO’s web 
server with ‘ping’ commands, which test whether a server is running and 
 33 
connected to the Internet,” and the effect of these attacks was to generate “line 
saturation” of the target servers (p. 268). 
(2) Email Bombs  
Denning (2001) asserts that bombarding government policy makers with 
thousands of messages via automated tools can cause a complete jam in their 
inboxes and make it impossible for required email to be received. During the 
Kosovo crisis, both sides of the conflict email bombed official sites. Denning 
(2001) notes:    
According to PA News, NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said the 
NATO server had been saturated at the end of March by one 
individual who was sending 2,000 messages a day. Fox News 
reported that when California resident Richard Clark heard of 
attacks against NATO’s website by Belgrade hackers, he retaliated 
by sending an email bomb to the Yugoslav government’s site. Clark 
said that a few days and 500,000 emails into the siege, the site 
went down. (pp. 269–270) 
(3) Web Hacks and Computer Break-ins  
Hacktivists can change what Internet users see when they visit a web 
page by hijacking the site, which involves “tampering with the Domain Name 
Service so that the site’s domain name resolves to the Internet protocol address 
of some other site” (Denning, 2001, pp. 272–273). Hacktivists can also deface a 
website by hacking into the site and changing its home page. During the Kosovo 
conflict, many websites were defaced. According to Fox News, the Boston Globe 
reported that a U.S. hacking group named Team Spl0it accessed government 
sites and posted statements like “Tell your governments to stop the war.” The 
Kosovo Hackers Group, which consisted of European and Albanian members, 
changed more than five sites with “Free Kosovo” banners. Furthermore, the 
“Serb Black Hand hackers group had deleted data on a U.S. Navy computer.” 
They also participated in operations to “block and disrupt military computers 
operated by NATO countries.” On the other hand, after NATO accidentally 
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bombed China’s Belgrade embassy, furious Chinese hackers supposedly 
attacked U.S. government sites (Denning, 2001, pp. 273–274). 
(4) Computer Viruses and Worms  
Denning (2001) notes that hacktivists have disseminated protest 
messages and impaired opponents’ computer systems by using computer 
viruses and worms. These malicious codes infect computers and proliferate over 
computer networks. She says that “during the Kosovo conflict, businesses, public 
organizations, and academic institutes received virus-laden emails from a range 
of Eastern European countries, according to mi2g, a London-based Internet 
software company” (p. 280). The damage to the receiver generally originated 
from many viruses attached to email, which included plain text or an anti-NATO 
cartoon. According to the mi2g’s claims, Serbian hackers threatened the 
economic infrastructure of NATO members more than “their better prepared” 
command and control systems (p. 280). 
2. Estonia (2007) 
In April and May of 2007, Estonia suffered a major cyber assault, and the 
world learned how severe a cyber-attack could be on a nation state (Miller & 
Kuehl, 2009). Some argue that this incident was a clear representation of 
cyberwar toward a country; however, some think that it was just a cyber riot 
taking place due to a political decision that created unrest in the society 
(Heickerö, 2010). Regardless of how these attacks are classified, this was a 
wake-up call to states to realize the seriousness of cyber threats. 
The riots started when the Estonian government decided to remove the 
Bronze Soldier monument made in the Soviet-era as a memorial of the Soviet 
victory against Nazi Germany in the World War II. However, people in Estonia 
ascribed different meanings to that monument. For the Estonians, the monument 
represented the occupation of Estonia by the Soviets; for the Russian minority in 
Estonia, the monument was a means to commemorate the heroism and sacrifice 
in World War II. Thousands of people made protests and demonstrations at the 
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memorial site after the Estonian government’s removal decision. These protests 
escalated into street riots, and many people were arrested or injured in these 
street riots. The riot in the streets then moved into cyberspace. In addition to the 
domestic riots between the people and government, Estonia also experienced 
political tension with Russia especially after joining NATO in 2004. 
The reason why these cyber-attacks spread over all of the country in a 
very short time and in a serious way is related to the Estonia’s highly 
computerized infrastructure. Despite its small size and population, Roland 
Heickerö (2010) notes that Estonia is “one of the most highly connected 
countries in the world” (p. 42), and the country is often referred to as eStonia by 
its citizens. The dependence of private and public sectors on cyberspace was 
very heavy at the time. Therefore, Estonia was a very attractive target because of 
its widespread public e-services and common use of Internet access by its 
population. This dependency made the Estonian government and its agencies, 
the economic entities in the country, and the population very vulnerable and open 
to large-scale disruptions (Tikk et al., 2010). 
Tikk et al. (2010) divided the cyber-attacks into two phases. The first 
phase occurred between April 27 and 29, and the attacks, which were mostly 
carried out by emotionally motivated actors, were less complex and showed poor 
coordination. However, during the second phase, which took place from April 30 
to May 18, the attacks were sophisticated and coordinated more professionally. 
There was also a clear correlation between the political tension and the intensity 
of the cyber-attacks. The attackers used denial of service (DoS) and distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks, mass unsolicited emails against government 
servers, website defacements, and disrupted DNS servers (Tikk et al., 2010). 
Tikk et al. (2010) assigns the targets of cyber-attacks to four categories. These 
are Internet infrastructure providers; governmental and political website targets, 
such as the websites of the prime minister, president, and Parliament State Audit 
Office, state departments, and state agencies like the Police Board, and the 
Reform Party; commercial services like e-banking; and random personal targets.  
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Heickerö (2010) states that the individuals, groups or organizations behind 
the operation had not been fully established yet al.though common perception 
and belief attribute these cyber-attacks to the Russian government, no digital 
forensics have ever proved the involvement of the Russian government (Miller & 
Kuehl, 2009). After the attacks, the State Informatics Center announced that 178 
countries’ computers were involved in these attacks, so it seemed like they were 
sourced worldwide (Tikk et al., 2010). However, Jason Healey and Leendert van 
Bochoven (2012) argue that many attacks came from Russia, the code of the 
malware was written in Russian, or the coordination was done through Russian 
websites, but it still is not adequate to attribute these cyber-attacks to Russia. 
Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet also accused the Russian government of 
being directly involved in the cyber-attacks (Bright, 2007). Despite the lack of 
evidence that would establish a direct link between the attacks and the Russian 
government, the allegation of Russia’s guilt was encouraged or at least ignored 
by the Kremlin (Healey & Bochoven, 2012). 
The cyber-attacks affected Estonia in economic, societal, and political 
ways. After seeing the consequences of these attacks, Estonia adopted its Cyber 
Security Strategy (Tikk et al., 2010). This strategy aims to develop a 
sophisticated and comprehensive cyber security culture to fight the risks 
associated with the vulnerabilities of cyberspace. Tikk et al. (2010) specify five 
main policy fronts to reach the objectives discussed in the Estonian Cyber 
Security Strategy. These are developing and implementing “system of security 
measures” (p. 30), “increasing expert awareness and competence in cyber 
security” (p. 30), improving “the legal framework for supporting cyber security” (p. 
30), “bolstering international cooperation” (p. 30), and “raising public awareness 
on cyber security” (p. 30). Stephen Herzog (2011) described the Estonia case as 
follows. 
The severity of the Estonian cyber-attacks served as a wake-up call 
to the world, as it became clear that potentially autonomous 
transnational networks—like unhappy pro-Kremlin hacktivists—
could avenge their grievances by digitally targeting and nearly 
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crippling the critical infrastructure of technically sophisticated 
nation-states. (p. 56) 
Therefore, this incident represented a cautionary example for states and 
international organizations about the cyber domain, and prompted them to take 
more serious measures in this area. For instance, NATO established the 
CCDCOE in 2008 in Tallinn, Estonia as a headquarters for the alliance’s cyber 
security concerns, because the Estonia case demonstrated to NATO that, as an 
alliance, it did not have the sufficient capability and presence in this domain to 
ensure the protection of its member countries’ sovereignty in cyberspace 
(Herzog, 2011). 
3. Georgia (2008) 
In 2008, the conflict between Georgia and Russia brought cyber security 
issues and considerations to the states’ attention once again, and as Robert 
Miller and Daniel Kuehl (2009) note, the “wake-up call in Estonia was repeated 
even more loudly” (p. 3). South Ossetia sits between Georgia and Russia, and 
historically, has been a region with many unresolved problems. After the 
Georgia-Ossetia conflict in 1991, the region became independent from Georgia 
in a de facto way (Tikk et al., 2010). Even though South Ossetia was recognized 
as integrated with Georgia by the international community, separatist movements 
continued.  
In a surprise and radical decision, the Georgian government started an 
attack against the separatist forces on August 7, 2008. The tension between 
Georgia and Russia rose quickly, and after Georgian Armed Forces responded to 
the provocation of the separation groups, the tension transformed into a hot 
conflict between two states. The following day, Russia responded with a military 
operation into the Georgian territories. This military operation was also backed by 
serious cyber-attacks that started on the evening of August 7 (Bicakci, 2014). 
There were three main methods used in the cyber-attacks against 
Georgia: website defacements, Structured Query Language (SQL) injections, 
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and DDoS attacks (Heickerö, 2010). In addition to these attacks, malicious 
software and attack instructions were distributed, and a list of email addresses of 
Georgian politicians was released for spamming purposes. On August 8, the 
cyber-attacks by hacktivists started against the websites of the president, 
defense and foreign affairs ministries, parliament, and the national bank when 
the Russian forces started their military operations across the border (Heickerö, 
2010). For more than a day, the website of the president was down due to a 
DDoS attack (Tikk et al., 2010). Many other websites of news and media 
institutions, hacker platforms, and financial institutions were also subjected to 
DoS and DDoS attacks.    
One of the Russian forums that played a critical role in the hacktivist 
attacks was stopgeorgia.ru. This website was set up within a couple of hours after 
the Russian forces started their military operations in South Ossetia (Heickerö, 
2010). Although the hosting firm for this website was registered in New York, its 
operations were conducted in St. Petersburg. More interestingly, Heickerö (2010) 
states that the office of this hosting firm was in the same building in St. Petersburg 
as a “Ministry of Defence Institute, the Russian Centre for Research of Military 
Strength of Foreign Countries” (p. 46). Moreover, the headquarters of the firm 
was located on the same street as well (Heickerö, 2010). 
There is also a consensus about the existence of coordination of the 
cyber-attacks (Tikk et al., 2010). The support and coordination activities were 
made in the Russian language and on the Pro-Russia forums, which 
demonstrate the Russian hacker community’s involvement. Although the 
consequences and the goals of the cyber-attacks strongly align with the Russian 
Federation’s interests in the Georgia conflict, it is very difficult to prove that 
Russia was directly involved in these attacks. The Russian government rejected 
the accusations of involvement in the cyber campaign. However, as Sergei A. 
Medvedev (2015) has observes in a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, “the 
historical record shows clear support of the Russian government and implied 
consent in its refusal to intervene or stop the hacker attacks” (p. 24). Even if the 
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Russian government was directly involved in the cyber-attacks or supported 
them, it participated in a very clandestine way (Medvedev, 2015). 
International assistance played a significant role in mitigating the effects of 
the cyber-attacks against Georgia. For example, the location of the website of the 
Ministry of Defense was moved to Atlanta, Georgia; the website of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was transferred to the servers of Estonia; Poland helped 
analyzing Internet protocol data, and France assisted with collecting log files 
while the attacks were taking place (Tikk et al., 2010). Therefore, the severity of 
the attacks was relatively reduced by the international assistance.  
The cyber-attacks did not cause very serious impacts on Georgia’s 
information capabilities because of the country’s relatively limited adoption of 
information technologies. In 2008, only 7 percent of the people in Georgia had 
Internet access, but the percentage was growing in a rapid way (Tikk et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, the attacks affected the country’s situation while the war 
was going on. Georgia lacked the ability to distribute information about the 
conflict both to its people and to the international community during the first few 
days of the conflict. Also, conventional and cyber warfare damaged the country’s 
communication and information network structure physically and technically (Tikk 
et al., 2010).  
The Georgia case was the first time that an offensive military operation 
was combined with a cyber operation (Heickerö, 2010). Heickerö states that “it 
could be seen as new modus operandi that could set the standard for the future 
cyber conflicts” (p. 47). Even though the war lasted for only a short time, Russia 
gained strategic advantages from this war by showing its military and cyber 
readiness (Hagen, 2013). Although the cyber warfare that took place in the 
Georgian conflict did not have a high level of sophistication, even at this low level 
of sophistication it succeeded in impairing strategic information and 
communication capabilities. Therefore, the role of cyber capabilities in the 
modern war concept arose once again in this case. 
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4. Stuxnet (2010) 
Although Iran suffered the most from the infamous Stuxnet attack, 
Indonesia, India, Azerbaijan, the United States, and Pakistan were also affected. 
Compared to these other countries, though, Iran seemed to be the prime target 
of this malicious computer warm (Bicakci, 2014). Neither NATO nor any of its 
member states faced severe harm from this attack, but similar methods could be 
used against the alliance. Ralph Langner, who is a German control system 
security consultant, delivered a TED talk, “Cracking Stuxnet, A 21st-century 
Cyber Weapon,” in 2011 about his analysis of the Stuxnet attack. Worldwide-
recognized consultant Langner (2011) described the concept behind the attack. 
The idea behind the Stuxnet computer worm is actually quite 
simple. We do not want Iran to get the bomb. Their major asset for 
developing nuclear weapons is the Natanz uranium enrichment 
facility. … Now if we manage to compromise these systems [real-
time control systems] that control drive speeds and valves, we can 
actually cause a lot of problems with the centrifuge. The gray boxes 
don’t run Windows software; they are a completely different 
technology. But if we manage to place a good Windows virus on a 
notebook that is used by a maintenance engineer to configure this 
gray box, then we are in business. And this is the plot behind 
Stuxnet. 
Thanks to the Stuxnet cyber weapon, Iran had to delay its nuclear 
program, and developers of Stuxnet accomplished their mission (Langner, 2011). 
Before his six months of research on Stuxnet, the only thing that Langner and his 
team knew was that the Windows part of Stuxnet was very complex, and “the 
dropper part, used multiple zero-day vulnerabilities.” After some research, they 
realized that this was a directed attack. Depending on the configuration of the 
system, Stuxnet either infects seriously and harms the system, or stays passive 
and does nothing at all. On the other hand, Langner and his team also figured 
out that professionals who had complete insider information designed the 
Stuxnet. “They [Stuxnet creators] knew all the bits and bytes that they had to 
attack.” Obviously, the designers knew every detail about the operators 
(Langner, 2011). 
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Jeffrey S. Caso (2014) notes that similar to how a virus physically 
penetrates the human body, Stuxnet infiltrates a digital system through a flash 
drive. This “malware, rumored to have been created by the U.S. and Israeli 
governments, infects all computers” that operate on Windows. Siemens, as a 
software firm, structured control systems used in Iran to control centrifuges of 
nuclear plants. Stuxnet is configured to gain “control of the Siemens system’s 
logic controllers, and force the centrifuges to spin at high speeds until they self-
annihilate—all while manipulating the feedback mechanisms into reporting that 
all is normal” (p. 255). 
The experts who wrote the Tallinn Manual could not reach consensus on 
whether the Stuxnet case was an armed attack or not; however, they agreed that 
the attacks created an illegal use of force (Caso, 2014). Langner (2011) asserts 
that if an agent could use traditional worm technology to spread the Stuxnet 
worm as wide as possible, that agent could construct “a cyber weapon of mass 
destruction.” Stuxnet significantly affected Iran, more specifically, the Natanz 
uranium enrichment facility. However, most of targets, which are prone to future 
attacks that may follow Stuxnet’s method, are in the United States, Europe, and 
Japan (Langner, 2011). Considering members of NATO, the alliance should be 
ready for this kind of attack, and NATO and its individual members should begin 
to prepare immediately. 
5. Ukraine (2014)  
For centuries, Crimea has been an arena for political and military 
struggles. Due to Crimea’s strategic and geopolitical significance, the conflicts 
have been very severe and bloody, like the Crimean War between 1853 and 
1856, where the biggest empires of the time fought one of the most critical wars 
in the modern history. The most recent crisis started in March 2014, with 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which was a Ukrainian territory. This happened 
when Ukraine was going through civil unrest caused by pro-Russian 
demonstrations. The conflict soon migrated to the cyber realm, and pro-Russian 
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hackers started disrupting Ukrainian communication and media networks early in 
the conflict.  
Tony Vegue (2015) outlines some major incidents regarding the timeline 
of the attacks against Ukraine. In February 2014, telecommunication facilites and 
fiber optic cables were damaged by armed men who infiltrated into the complex. 
In the same month, hackers started a campaign against NATO and Ukrainian 
media agencies by launching DDoS attacks. To create confusion and mistrust in 
the public during the Ukrainian elections held in October 2014, election 
committee websites were targets of DDoS attacks by pro-Russian hackers 
(Vegue, 2015).  
The Kremlin has made substantial investments in information operations 
as part of its strategy in Ukraine (Geers, 2015). As Kenneth Geers (2015) notes, 
cyber-attacks against Ukraine have included “cyber espionage, prepping the 
battlefield, selective telegraphing of capabilities, and some hints at destructive 
activities” (p. 67). According to Medvedev (2015), a pro-Russian hacker group 
called CyberBerkut stated that they had interfered in the Ukrainian elections, 
defaced several German websites, prevented many military cooperation 
documents to be communicated between the United States and Ukraine, blocked 
government websites and media outlets of NATO and Ukraine, and did black 
propaganda on various platforms. There were also other cyber-attacks 
committed by other pro-Russian groups, such as leaking private calls of 
government officials, releasing critical documents and information about political 
and military decisions, and blocking phone service (Medvedev, 2015). The 
sophistication level of the attacks varied from low level to high level; therefore, 
the measures to defend against these attacks changed due to the different 
features of the attacks being faced (Geers, 2015). 
Like in the cases of Estonia and Georgia, the Ukrainian case has no clear 
evidence identifying the state actor behind the cyber-attacks. However, it was 
again very obvious that all of the cyber campaigns and attacks served Moscow’s 
strategic and operational goals. Therefore, Ukraine’s head of counterintelligence, 
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Vitaly Naida stated, “We consider that there is only one country in the world that 
would benefit from these attacks, and this is Russia” (Coker & Sonne, 2015, 
para. 10). However, Dmitry Peskov, who is the Kremlin’s spokesperson, denied 
all of the accusations and noted that many hacker groups also attack Russian 
computer systems regularly (Coker & Sonne, 2015). Even though Russian 
government officials reject any accusations, their denials of their role in the 
attacks started to lose credibility with the recent incidents. 
Hybrid war concepts have been shown to be very effective and promising 
in recent international conflicts. Medvedev (2015) has acknowledged that “cyber 
operations conducted by Russian surrogates have undermined Ukrainian state 
legitimacy, embarrassed NATO allies, and intimidated opposition forces” (p. 26). 
Therefore, states, as individual actors, and collective defense mechanisms like 
NATO need to take more serious measures to defend themselves in the cyber 
domain. 
6. Other Cyber Incidents  
In addition to the significant cyber cases mentioned previously, many 
other cyber operations have been conducted by various actors to reach different 
goals. Andress and Winterfeld (2014) provide a cyber timeline in their book; 
however, when it comes to comparing this cyber timeline with Wikipedia’s 
(“Timeline of Computer Viruses and Worms,” 2016), there are some 
mismatches—especially in virus and worm related information. Omitting the 
controversial asides, a shorter list of the significant events that Andress and 
Winterfeld (2014) provided in their timeline appears here:   
1999 Melissa virus unleashed. 
1999 NATO accidentally bombs the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 
spawning a wave of cyber-attacks from China against U.S. 
government websites. 
2001 Code Red worm hit—designed to conduct DDoS against 
White House. 
2003 Titan Rain attacks identified, believed to be from China; it 
spawns new term “Advanced Persistent Threat” 
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2007 Storm Worm (one of the first botnets) began infecting 
thousands of (mostly private) computers in Europe and the United 
States 
2007 British Security Service, French Prime Minister’s Office, and 
Office of the German Chancellor all complained to China about 
intrusion on their government networks. 
2008 Databases of both the Republican and Democratic 
presidential campaigns were hacked and downloaded by unknown 
foreign intruders. 
2008 The networks of several congressional offices were hacked 
by unknown foreign intruders (some incidents involved offices with 
an interest in human rights or Tibet). 
2009 Ghost Net report released by Canadian researchers who 
found espionage tools they attributed to China implanted on 
government networks of 103 countries. 
2009 Reports in the press suggest that the plans for Marine Corps 
1, the new presidential helicopter, were found on a file-sharing 
network in Iran. 
2009 Reports reveal that hackers downloaded data about the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter, a multibillion-dollar high-tech fighter jet. 
2010 Operation Aurora in which Google publicly reveals being 
hacked (China blamed). 
2010 WikiLeaks released U.S. embassy cables; Anonymous 
attacks MasterCard for no longer accepting donations for them. 
2010 China redirected 15 percent of Internet traffic through its 
country (claimed it was an accident); this showed DNS 
weaknesses. 
2011 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) attack allowed its security 
tokens to be compromised (used by government, Department of 
Defense (DOD) contractors, and financial organizations to name a 
few); China suspected. 
2011 Duqu (son of Stuxnet) discovered. 
2011 Global Energy Cyber-attacks “Night Dragon” report released 
showing systematic economic espionage against energy sector 
companies; China suspected. 
2012 Anonymous attacks Sony multiple times causing impact on 
gamers. 
2012 Flame and Gauss state-sponsored cyber exploit discovered—
tied to Stuxnet. 
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2012 Shamoon attack against Saudi Aramco, one of the world’s 
largest oil conglomerates, resulted in more than 30,000 computer 
systems being wiped of all data. 
2013 South Korean banks and media report large number of 
computer network crashes causing speculation of North Korea 
cyber-attack. (pp. 291–295) 
This cyber timeline covers cases until 2013, but many other cases have 
been reported by the media since then. To illustrate, three cyber-attacks are 
worth mentioning: cyber-attacks against a German steel mill and Sony Pictures in 
2014 and the Ukrainian power grid attack in 2015. 
D. SUMMARY 
As an intergovernmental military alliance, NATO is under various cyber 
threats. In general, scholars classify cyber threats into four categories: 
cybercrime, cyber espionage, cyberterrorism, and cyber warfare. There are two 
types of cyber actors, who may pose as threats to NATO: state actors and non-
state actors. Intelligence services and armed forces are considered as state 
actors. Non-state actors can be categorized as individual actors, corporations, 
cyber terrorists, and organized cybercrime actors. 
Various cyber actors have been conducting numerous cyber operations, 
and many of these incidents have a direct or indirect relation with NATO. Among 
the significant cases, during the Serbian-NATO Conflict, NATO was confronted 
with activist and hacktivist activities in cyberspace. In the Estonia case, the 
actors mainly used DoS and DDoS attacks as well as website defacements. In 
2008, during the conflict between Georgia and Russia, cyber actors used three 
main methods against Georgia: webpage defacements, SQL injections, and 
DDoS attacks. In 2010, the Stuxnet case showed that a computer worm can 
cause physical damage to critical infrastructure. In 2014, Ukraine suffered from 
various cyber-attacks, such as distrupting cellular phones, campaigning against 
media agencies by DDoS attacks, and creating mistrust of the October 2014 
Ukrainian elections by sophisticated cyber-attacks against official websites.      
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Consequently, these significant cyber cases show that similar methods 
can be used in different cyber-attacks, and unique tactics can be implemented for 
the first time to conduct a successful cyber operation. Other cyber cases and 
recent developments reveal that cyber actors may continue to use conventional 
methods, and these attackers may also transform the previous tactics into 
unprecedented ones. The next question is what policies has NATO implemented 
to fight against cyber threats? 
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IV. NATO POLICIES TO FIGHT AGAINST CYBER THREATS 
As discussed in the previous chapter, NATO’s new focus on cyber 
defense stems from the 1999 Kosovo conflict when the pro-Serbian cyber 
attackers tried to impair the communication infrastructure of the alliance (Burton, 
2015). According to the official webpage of NATO (2016f), cyber threats and 
aggressions “are becoming more common, sophisticated and damaging.” NATO 
faces a very complex and evolving threat environment. A part of military 
operations, both state and non-state actors can effectively conduct cyber 
operations. Recent developments have shown that cyber operations are part of 
hybrid warfare (NATO, 2016f).  
According to Jeffrey L. Caton (2016), the improvement of cyber defense 
capabilities for NATO “has been making steady progress since its formal 
introduction at the North Atlantic Council Prague Summit in 2002” (p. 1). Between 
this summit and the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO members agreed on important 
decisions in terms of cyber defense. Bolstered by various and numerous cyber-
attacks “such as those in Estonia in 2007,” NATO’s priorities were “formalized in 
subsequent NATO cyber policies that were adopted in 2008, 2011, and 2014” 
(Caton, 2016, p. 1). NATO and its members aim to depend on sound and 
resilient cyber security to accomplish “the Alliance’s core tasks of collective 
defence, crisis management and cooperative security” (NATO, 2016f). 
A. EVOLUTION 
Organizations and institutions evolve throughout time as they face new 
and different challenges. In terms of cyber threats, NATO has experienced 
significant evolution and transformation in its structure, policies, and doctrines. 
The decisions made and actions taken in the summits of the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) are good representations and reflections of tracking the evolving 
progress of NATO’s cyber policy. The following subsections examine the 2002 
Prague Summit, the 2006 Riga Summit, the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the 2009 
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Strasburg-Kehl Summit, the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the 2012 Chicago Summit, the 
2014 Wales Summit, and the 2016 Warsaw Summit from the perspective of 
cyber defense. 
1. Prague Summit (2002) 
The 2002 Prague Summit was the first place where cyber defense 
appeared in the political agenda of NATO, even though the organization had 
taken several measures to defend its information and communication capabilities 
before this summit (NATO, 2016f). In the NATO press releases of the Prague 
Summit Declaration, the cyber defense issues were expressed as follows: 
Effective military forces, an essential part of our overall political 
strategy, are vital to safeguard the freedom and security of our 
populations and to contribute to peace and security in the Euro-
Atlantic region. We have therefore decided to: … strengthen our 
capabilities to defend against cyber-attacks. (para. 4) 
In this summit, numerous measures were taken to fight against terrorism 
and strengthen NATO’s capabilities because of the 9/11 attacks. This included 
measures in the cyber domain as well. Member countries collectively decided to 
form the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), and they 
established the NATO Cyber Defense Program as an institutional development 
for responding to threats in the cyber domain (Caton, 2016). The NATO 
Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and NCIRC serve to provide an 
integrated and constant cyber defense for the alliance’s information and 
communication infrastructure in accordance with the Cyber Defense Program. 
Over time, the capabilities and the capacity of the NCIRC have evolved to meet 
the requirements of current technological advances and the complexity of cyber 
threats. 
2. Riga Summit (2006) 
Although there were attempts and initiatives for making progress in cyber 
defense after the Prague Summit, the issue did not come up again in the formal 
meetings of the NAC until the Riga Summit in 2006. In the NATO (2006) press 
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releases of the Riga Summit Declaration, the cyber defense issues were 
expressed as follows: 
The adaptation of our forces must continue. We have endorsed a 
set of initiatives to increase the capacity of our forces to address 
contemporary threats and challenges. These include: work to 
develop a NATO Network Enabled Capability to share information, 
data and intelligence reliably, securely and without delay in Alliance 
operations, while improving protection of our key information 
systems against cyber-attack. (para. 24–29) 
The leaders of the member countries had agreed in this summit to provide 
further protection for the information systems of NATO (NATO, 2016f). It was 
emphasized that efforts for advancing NATO’s cyber security should be 
continued and increased (Burton, 2015). It was also stated that the NATO 
Network Enabled Capability could serve as a means to share information in the 
operations of NATO and improve cyber defense of the organization (Caton, 
2016). 
3. Bucharest Summit (2008) 
The cyber-attacks against the private and public institutions of Estonia in 
2007 were a wake-up call for NATO. After this incident, defense ministers of the 
member countries agreed to work on the issue of cyber defense urgently. In 
response to this case, the first policy on cyber defense was approved by NATO 
in early 2008. The conflict between Georgia and Russia had also proven to the 
alliance that cyber capabilities could be used in combination with conventional 
warfare (NATO, 2016f). In the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the member states 
agreed that the relationship between NATO and the national authorities on cyber 
defense should be enhanced, the experiences of the member states regarding 
cyber issues should be shared, and the states should assist each other when 
required. In the NATO press releases of the Bucharest Summit Declaration, the 
cyber defense issues were expressed as follows: 
NATO remains committed to strengthening key Alliance information 
systems against cyber-attacks. We have recently adopted a Policy 
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on Cyber Defence, and are developing the structures and 
authorities to carry it out. Our Policy on Cyber Defence emphasizes 
the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems 
in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best 
practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon 
request, to counter a cyber-attack. We look forward to continuing 
the development of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities and 
strengthening the linkages between NATO and national authorities. 
(para. 47) 
In summary, the key tenets of NATO’s cyber policy after the Bucharest 
Summit were to “emphasize protection of key information systems”; “share best 
practices for cyber defence”; “develop capability to assist Allied nations, upon 
request, to counter cyber-attack”; “develop NATO’s cyber defence capabilities”; and 
“strengthen linkage between NATO and national authorities” (Caton, 2016, p. 7). 
4. Strasburg-Kehl Summit (2009) 
There were two significant developments after the Bucharest Summit. The 
first was the establishment of the NATO Cyber Defense Management Authority 
for the purpose of centralizing cyber defense capacity under one authority in 
order to increase the operational capability. Second was the activation of the 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia (Bicakci, 
2014). In the 2009 Strasburg-Kehl Summit, leaders decided to improve their 
Computer Incident Response Capability as well. In the NATO press releases of 
the Strasburg-Kehl Summit Declaration, the cyber defense issues were 
expressed as follows: 
We remain committed to strengthening communication and 
information systems that are of critical importance to the Alliance 
against cyber-attacks, as state and non-state actors may try to 
exploit the Alliance’s and Allies’ growing reliance on these systems. 
To prevent and respond to such attacks, in line with our agreed 
Policy on Cyber Defence, we have established a NATO Cyber 
Defence Management Authority, improved the existing Computer 
Incident Response Capability, and activated the Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. We will accelerate our 
cyber defence capabilities in order to achieve full readiness. Cyber 
defence is being made an integral part of NATO exercises. We are 
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further strengthening the linkages between NATO and Partner 
countries on protection against cyber-attacks. In this vein, we 
have developed a framework for cooperation on cyber 
defence between NATO and Partner countries, and acknowledge 
the need to cooperate with international organizations, as 
appropriate. (para. 49) 
In 2009, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly issued a detailed report called 
NATO and Cyber Defense, which discusses critical issues in the cyber domain 
relating to NATO (Caton, 2016). NATO had made significant policy 
implementations and institutional developments in order to protect itself against 
cyber threats within a couple of years after experiencing serious incidents in the 
cyber domain. The organization also pursued a strategy to enhance its members’ 
cyber security through both coordinating measures and deterrence. 
5. Lisbon Summit (2010) 
At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO introduced a new strategic concept, 
and announced that NAC had been tasked to develop a detailed cyber defense 
policy and come up with an action and implementation plan for this policy (NATO, 
2016f). This new concept and policy aimed to strengthen protection of NATO’s 
communication and information systems against advanced cyber threats 
(Alexander, 2014). In the NATO press releases of the Lisbon Summit 
Declaration, the cyber defense issues were expressed as follows: 
Cyber threats are rapidly increasing and evolving in sophistication. 
In order to ensure NATO’s permanent and unfettered access to 
cyberspace and integrity of its critical systems, we will take into 
account the cyber dimension of modern conflicts in NATO’s 
doctrine and improve its capabilities to detect, assess, prevent, 
defend and recover in case of a cyber-attack against systems of 
critical importance to the Alliance. We will strive in particular to 
accelerate NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) 
to Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2012 and the bringing of all 
NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection. We will use 
NATO’s defence planning processes in order to promote the 
development of Allies’ cyber defence capabilities, to assist 
individual Allies upon request, and to optimize information sharing, 
collaboration and interoperability. To address the security risks 
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emanating from cyberspace, we will work closely with other actors, 
such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), as 
agreed. We have tasked the Council to develop, drawing notably on 
existing international structures and on the basis of a review of our 
current policy, a NATO in-depth cyber defence policy by June 2011 
and to prepare an action plan for its implementation. (para. 40) 
The new strategic concept, called Active Engagement, Modern Defense, 
delineates the purpose of NATO, critical security missions of the alliance, and the 
future security environment (Caton, 2016). It also addresses how military forces 
need to adapt themselves in accordance with the new strategic concept. In the 
history of NATO, there had only been six strategic concepts before this one. 
They were all related to the Cold War and post-Cold War security considerations. 
The new concept focuses on three fundamental tasks: “collective defense, crisis 
management, and cooperative security” (Caton, 2016, p. 5). The new strategy 
recognizes that the future security environment will include more complex, 
frequent, organized, and costly cyber-attacks. The attacks will not necessarily 
come from states, but could also come from criminal or terrorist groups that 
threaten the alliance. Therefore, NATO continuously needs to update its defense 
and deterrence posture. The strategic concept of Active Engagement, Modern 
Defense (2010) states,  
We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities 
necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and 
security of our populations. Therefore, we will…develop further our 
ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-
attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance 
and coordinate national cyber defence capabilities, bringing all 
NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better 
integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with 
member nations. (para. 19) 
After the Lisbon Summit, NATO defense ministers endorsed a new policy 
on cyber defense that includes an associated implementation and action plan for 
the new threat environment in the cyber domain in order to achieve a well-
coordinated effort throughout the alliance (NATO, 2016f). The key tenets stated 
in “Defending the Networks: The NATO Policy on Cyber Defense” (2011) are 
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“integrate cyber considerations into NATO structures and planning processes in 
order to perform NATO’s core tasks of collective defence and crisis 
management”; “focus on prevention, resilience, and defence of critical cyber 
assets to NATO and Allies”; “develop robust cyber defence capabilities and 
centralize protection of NATO’s own networks”; “develop minimum requirements 
for cyber defence of national networks critical to NATO’s core tasks”; “provide 
assistance to the Allies to achieve a minimum level of cyber defence and reduce 
vulnerabilities of national critical infrastructures”; and “engage with partners, 
international organizations, the private sector and academia” (p. 1). 
One of the most important issues raised in the Lisbon Summit was the call 
for NATO to work and cooperate more closely with the European Union (EU) on 
cyber defense issues (Caton, 2016). International organizations like NATO and 
the EU are likely targets for cyber-attacks. Therefore, cyber security is a 
significant aspect of the organizations’ and their member countries’ defense. The 
cooperation between NATO and the EU in the cyber domain could provide 
significant advantages for both organizations (Caton, 2016).  
Although there was a clear call at the Lisbon Summit for the integration of 
the cyber dimension into the structure of NATO, the actual process has not been 
as consistent and rapid as desired (Caton, 2016). For instance, FOC could only 
be achieved in 2014 at a cost of $74.5 million even though it was pushed after 
the Lisbon and Chicago Summits in 2010 and 2012, respectively. One of the 
leading managers of the project has said that “full operational capability is 
perhaps a misnomer—cyber threats are constantly evolving, and we [NATO] will 
never have a final or full capability” (Caton, 2016, p. 34). Currently, the FOC 
provides an enhanced cyber security to the 55 NATO sites all around the world.  
6. Chicago Summit (2012) 
At the Chicago Summit, leaders of the member states reiterated their 
commitment to enhance the cyber security of NATO’s information and 
communication systems under a centralized defense structure with some 
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upgrades to NCIRC (NATO, 2016f). In the NATO press releases of the Chicago 
Summit Declaration, the cyber defense issues were expressed as follows: 
Cyber-attacks continue to increase significantly in number and 
evolve in sophistication and complexity. We reaffirm the cyber 
defence commitments made at the Lisbon Summit. Following 
Lisbon, last year we adopted a Cyber Defence Concept, Policy, and 
Action Plan, which [is] now being implemented. Building on NATO’s 
existing capabilities, the critical elements of the NATO Computer 
Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Full Operational Capability 
(FOC), including protection of most sites and users, will be in place 
by the end of 2012. We have committed to provide the resources 
and complete the necessary reforms to bring all NATO bodies 
under centralized cyber protection, to ensure that enhanced cyber 
defence capabilities protect our collective investment in NATO. We 
will further integrate cyber defence measures into Alliance 
structures and procedures and, as individual nations, we remain 
committed to identifying and delivering national cyber defence 
capabilities that strengthen Alliance collaboration and 
interoperability, including through NATO defence planning 
processes. We will develop further our ability to prevent, detect, 
defend against, and recover from cyber-attacks. To address the 
cyber security threats and to improve our common security, we are 
committed to engage with relevant partner nations on a case-by-
case basis and with international organizations, inter alia the EU, as 
agreed, the Council of Europe, the UN and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in order to increase 
concrete cooperation. We will also take full advantage of the 
expertise offered by the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence in Estonia. (para. 49) 
At the Chicago Summit, NATO decided to adopt a new Cyber Defense 
Policy, concept, and action plan (Caton, 2016). The improvement of cyber 
defense capabilities of NATO was reemphasized by the implementation of more 
developed procedures and structures for interoperability and collaborative 
purposes. Collaboration among the member states in the alliance is vital for the 
success of the new cyber defense policies and concepts. It helps states’ cyber 
systems reach certain standards that reinforce the alliance’s overall cyber 
security. The collaboration could be accomplished by building situational 
awareness, optimized information sharing, and reliable interoperability under 
agreed upon and shared standards among member countries. The cooperation 
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with other international organizations like the EU, the UN, and OSCE was 
highlighted again in the Chicago Summit. 
There were some other developments between the Chicago and Wales 
Summits. In 2014, allied defense ministers were charged with developing a new 
Cyber Defense Policy, NAC changed the name of the Defense Policy and 
Planning Committee/Cyber Defense to Cyber Defense Committee, and NCIRC 
FOC was achieved with an improved protection of NATO’s information systems 
and networks (NATO, 2016f).   
7. Wales Summit (2014) 
Allied countries approved a new Cyber Defense Policy and action plan at 
the 2014 Wales Summit. The policy and action plan are being reviewed by the 
member countries to determine if they meet the technical and political 
requirements for the current cyber threat environment (NATO, 2016f). In the 
NATO (2014b) press releases of the Wales Summit Declaration, the cyber 
defense issues were addressed: 
As the Alliance looks to the future, cyber threats and attacks will 
continue to become more common, sophisticated, and potentially 
damaging. To face this evolving challenge, we have endorsed an 
Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy, contributing to the fulfillment of 
the Alliance’s core tasks. The policy reaffirms the principles of the 
indivisibility of Allied security and of prevention, detection, 
resilience, recovery, and defence. It recalls that the fundamental 
cyber defence responsibility of NATO is to defend its own networks, 
and that assistance to Allies should be addressed in accordance 
with the spirit of solidarity, emphasizing the responsibility of Allies 
to develop the relevant capabilities for the protection of national 
networks. Our policy also recognizes that international law, 
including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, 
applies in cyberspace. Cyber-attacks can reach a threshold that 
threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and 
stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a 
conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part 
of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when 
a cyber-attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would 
be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. 
(para. 72) 
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The press release describing the declaration of NATO’s stance on cyber defense 
continues: 
We are committed to developing further our national cyber defence 
capabilities, and we will enhance the cyber security of national 
networks upon which NATO depends for its core tasks, in order to 
help make the Alliance resilient and fully protected. Close bilateral 
and multinational cooperation plays a key role in enhancing the 
cyber defence capabilities of the Alliance. We will continue to 
integrate cyber defence into NATO operations and operational and 
contingency planning, and enhance information sharing and 
situational awareness among Allies. Strong partnerships play a key 
role in addressing cyber threats and risks. We will therefore 
continue to engage actively on cyber issues with relevant partner 
nations on a case-by-case basis and with other international 
organisations, including the EU, as agreed, and will intensify our 
cooperation with industry through a NATO Industry Cyber 
Partnership. Technological innovations and expertise from the 
private sector are crucial to enable NATO and Allies to achieve the 
Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy’s objectives. We will improve the 
level of NATO’s cyber defence education, training, and exercise 
activities. We will develop the NATO cyber range capability, 
building, as a first step, on the Estonian cyber range capability, 
while taking into consideration the capabilities and requirements of 
the NATO Communications and Information Systems (CIS) School 
and other NATO training and education bodies. (para. 73) 
At the Wales Summit, NATO emphasized the significance of close 
relationships with industry and restated the importance of cooperation with the 
other international organizations like the EU. The role of training, education, and 
exercise for the cyber defense of the alliance was noted and the efforts for 
development in this field were approved. The NATO Industry Cyber Partnership 
(NICP) was endorsed at the Wales Summit as an initiative to increase 
cooperation between the private sector and NATO on cyber challenges and 
threats. A two-day conference about cyber collaboration took place in Belgium 
that hosted more than a thousand industry leaders and policy makers. NICP 
understands that a successful cyber defense of the alliance depends on strong 
communication and collaboration between private industry and NATO (NATO, 
2016f). For the purpose of preventing and responding to cyber-attacks, the EU 
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and NATO made a technical arrangement on cyber security. This arrangement 
between the Computer Emergency Response Team of the European Union 
(CERT-EU) and NCIRC enables them to share information, experiences, 
practices, and knowledge about cyber-related issues. 
8. Warsaw Summit (2016) 
Cyberspace was recognized as the fifth domain of operations at the 2016 
Warsaw Summit, adding to the existing domains of land, sea, air, and space 
(NATO, 2016f). However, recognition of this new domain does not alter the 
defensive mission of NATO. The alliance is still constrained to act by 
international law in every domain. Since most of the current crises and conflicts 
involve cyber elements, treating cyberspace as a new domain offers advantages 
and flexibility for NATO’s operations and missions. In the NATO (2016c) press 
releases of Warsaw Summit Declaration, the cyber defense issues were 
expressed as follows: 
Cyber-attacks present a clear challenge to the security of the 
Alliance and could be as harmful to modern societies as a 
conventional attack. We agreed in Wales that cyber defence is part 
of NATO’s core task of collective defence. Now, in Warsaw, we 
reaffirm NATO’s defensive mandate, and recognize cyberspace as 
a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as 
effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea. This will 
improve NATO’s ability to protect and conduct operations across 
these domains and maintain our freedom of action and decision, in 
all circumstances. It will support NATO’s broader deterrence and 
defence: cyber defence will continue to be integrated into 
operational planning and Alliance operations and missions, and we 
will work together to contribute to their success. Furthermore, it will 
ensure more effective organization of NATO’s cyber defence and 
better management of resources, skills, and capabilities. This forms 
part of NATO’s long term adaptation. We continue to implement 
NATO’s Enhanced Policy on Cyber Defence and strengthen 
NATO’s cyber defence capabilities, benefiting from the latest 
cutting edge technologies. We reaffirm our commitment to act in 
accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, 
international humanitarian law, and human rights law, as 
applicable. We will continue to follow the principle of restraint and 
support maintaining international peace, security, and stability in 
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cyberspace. We welcome the work on voluntary international norms 
of responsible state behaviour and confidence-building measures 
regarding cyberspace. (para. 70) 
The press release describing the declaration of NATO’s stance on cyber defense 
continues: 
We will ensure that Allies are equipped for, and meet requirements 
tailored to, the 21st century. Today, through our Cyber Defence 
Pledge, we have committed to enhance the cyber defences of our 
national networks and infrastructures, as a matter of priority. Each 
Ally will honor its responsibility to improve its resilience and ability 
to respond quickly and effectively to cyber-attacks, including in 
hybrid contexts. Together with the continuous adaptation of NATO’s 
cyber defence capabilities, this will reinforce the Alliance’s cyber 
defence. We are expanding the capabilities and scope of the NATO 
Cyber Range, where Allies can build skills, enhance expertise, and 
exchange best practices. We remain committed to close bilateral 
and multilateral cyber defence cooperation, including on information 
sharing and situational awareness, education, training, and 
exercises. Strong partnerships play a key role in effectively 
addressing cyber challenges. We will continue to deepen 
cooperation with the EU, as agreed, including through the on-going 
implementation of the Technical Arrangement that contributes to 
better prevention and response to cyber-attacks. We will further 
enhance our partnerships with other international organizations and 
partner nations, as well as with industry and academia through the 
NATO Industry Cyber Partnership. (para. 71) 
The partnership with the EU was reemphasized at the Warsaw Summit, 
together with cooperation with private industry through NICP. By introducing the 
Cyber Defense Pledge, NATO aimed to strengthen the nation states’ networks 
and infrastructure for reinforcing the overall resilience and cyber defense of the 
organization (NATO, 2016f). 
B. GOVERNANCE 
In the previous section, several summits were discussed and analyzed in 
terms of cyber defense. This section focuses on cyber defense policy updates in 
2008, 2011, and 2014. Moreover, hierarchical responsibilities of various bodies in 
NATO are reviewed to better understand the governance of cyber defense.   
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1. Cyber Defense Policy Updates 
Caton (2016) notes that “[a]n initial NATO Cyber Defence Policy was 
adopted at the 2008 NATO NAC Summit in Bucharest” (p. 6). Later, this policy 
was updated after the 2010 Lisbon and 2014 Wales summits. Focusing on “key 
tenets of NATO Cyber Policy,” in 2008, the policy highlighted protection of critical 
information systems, development of capability to support allies, and strong ties 
between NATO and national officials (Caton, 2016, p. 7).  
In 2011, the cyber defense policy aimed to “integrate cyber defence 
considerations into NATO structures and planning processes” to implement 
NATO’s main tasks of “collective defence and crisis management.” Another goal 
was to develop strong cyber defense capabilities especially for critical cyber 
assets and to centralize security of NATO’s own networks. Furthermore, 
assisting members to reach a minimum level of cyber defense and engaging with 
allies, international organizations, the private sector and academic world were 
other objectives of the policy (Caton, 2016, p. 7).  
In 2014, in addition to the 2011 updates, the policy focused on 
fundamental cyber defense responsibility, which was to protect its own networks, 
but at the same time assumed responsibility to help allies to develop their 
national networks. Besides, NATO acknowledged that international law applies to 
cyber operations and confirmed that “cyber defense is part of NATO’s collective 
defense under Article 5” (Caton, 2016, p. 8). 
The initial version of the policy provided some of the basic elements for 
future policies and started the process of centralizing NATO efforts in cyberspace 
through institutions such as the Cyber Defense Management Authority (CDMA). 
The mission of The CDMA was “to initiate and coordinate cyber defenses, review 
capabilities, and conduct appropriate risk management” (Caton, 2016, p. 6). 
Although publicly available information is limited, the CDMA is believed to have 
“real-time electronic monitoring capabilities for pinpointing threats and sharing 
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critical cyber intelligence in real-time,” with the aim of ultimately “becoming an 
operational war” institution for cyber security (Hathaway et al., 2012, p. 862). 
2. Hierarchical Responsibilities in Governance 
The NATO Policy on Cyber Defense is carried out by “political, military 
and technical authorities” of NATO, as well as by alliance members (NATO, 
2016f). As Caton (2016) notes, “The 2011 NATO Cyber Defence Policy followed 
the adoption of the new NATO Strategic Concept” and thus concentrated on 
methods to enhance NATO’s collective capacity to block, detect, “defend against 
and recover from cyber-attacks” (p. 7). On the other hand, the 2011 policy also 
built “a cyber defense governance with a hierarchy that flowed from the NAC to 
the Defence Policy and Planning Committee in Reinforced Format, then to the 
NATO Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB), and finally to the NCIRC” 
(Caton, 2016, p. 7). 
According to Caton (2016), the 2014 NATO Enhanced Cyber Defense 
Policy clarifies cyber governance mechanisms and formally connects cyber to the 
conventional and core collective defense task of NATO. However, alliance 
members are expected to guard their national networks, because the updated 
policy formulates that NATO is primarily responsible for guarding its own network 
systems (Caton, 2016, p. 8). “The NAC is apprised of major cyber incidents and 
attacks” (NATO, 2016f), as it is the responsible body that provides “strategic-level 
oversight and exercises principal authority in cyber defence-related crisis 
management” (Caton, 2016, p. 8).  
Another key element of NATO cyber governance is the Cyber Defense 
Committee, previously named the Defense Policy and Planning 
Committee/Cyber Defense, and “subordinate to the NAC.” It serves as “the lead 
committee for political governance and cyber defence policy in general, providing 
oversight and advice to Allied countries on NATO’s cyber defence efforts at the 
expert level” (Caton, 2016, p. 8). When it comes to the working level, the NATO 
CDMB is mainly responsible for cyber security coordination among both “NATO 
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civilian and military bodies.” The CDMB charges “the leaders of the policy, 
military, operational and technical bodies in NATO” with responsibilities for cyber 
defense (Caton, 2016, p. 9). 
The NATO Consultation, Control and Command Board establishes the 
primary “committee for consultation on technical” and application aspects of 
cyber defense (NATO, 2016f). The NATO Military Authorities and NATO 
Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) carry the distinct 
responsibilities for detecting “the statement of operational requirements, 
acquisition, implementation and operating of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities.” 
Allied Command Transformation deals with the planning and implementation of 
the yearly Cyber Coalition Exercise (NATO, 2016f). 
In a general overview, Caton (2016) summarizes the NCIRC development 
progress as follows:  
The effort will be implemented in several increments and will 
include an upgraded capability to identify, trap and analyze 
malware and cyber-attacks launched against alliance systems; 
advanced sensors to provide improved early detection of threats 
against NATO networks; a consolidated information assurance 
picture that will give operators an overview of the situation across 
NATO networks, including a dynamic risk assessment; and an 
upgraded and advanced threat assessment capability. (p. 49) 
Finally, the NCIRC Technical and Coordination Centers are two critical 
bodies in terms of cyber defense efforts in NATO. According to the official 
webpage of NATO, NCIA, “through its NCIRC Technical Centre in Mons, 
Belgium,” is in charge of “the provision of technical” services of cyber defense 
throughout the alliance. The NCIRC Technical Center has a crucial role in 
reacting to all cyber-attacks against NATO. This center also deals with and 
reports incidents, and distributes critical information from incident to 
system/security managers and users (NATO, 2016f). As a staff element, the 
NCIRC Coordination Center’s responsibility is the organization of cyber defense 
actions in NATO and with the organization members, and for personnel “support 
to the CDMB” (NATO, 2016f).  
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C. SUMMARY 
Focusing on policy development and governance, NATO has 
acknowledged that cyber security is part of collective defense and confirmed that 
international law should be applied in cyberspace. In 2016, Alliance members 
reaffirmed that they recognize cyberspace as a new domain of operations in 
addition to air, land, sea, and space. Allies are responsible for the security of 
their own networks, but at the same time, their systems are required to be 
compatible with those of other members and NATO. NATO develops its capacity 
for cyber-related “education, training and exercises.” Allies are responsible for 
information sharing and cooperation in blocking, alleviating, and restoring from 
cyber-attacks. In February 2016, to develop better cyber defense cooperation, 
NATO signed a Technical Arrangement with the EU. Lastly, NATO intensifies “its 
cooperation with industry,” by means of the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership 
(NATO, 2016f). 
Nevertheless, Caton (2016) raises the question “how would this 
governance process be applied to determine the appropriate response to any 
perceived aggression in cyberspace against NATO” or its members (p. 9)? The 
steps for engagement start at the technical level, and if an event has political 
significance, “NATO’s cyber defense efforts get elevated from the NCIRC to the 
CDMB and Cyber Defence Committee through to the NAC” (p. 9). The NAC 
would “determine the appropriate level of response,” to that point of “invoking col-
lective defense through Article 5 of the NATO Charter, although this is 
considered unlikely unless there is significant physical damage or deaths 
involved” (Caton, 2016, p. 9). Professor Michael Schmitt, “the best-known 
proponent of the effects-based approach for determining when a cyber-attack 
should be considered an armed attack,” notes that effects of a cyber-attack 
should be evaluated by reference to six factors2 (Hathaway et al., 2012, p. 848). 
                                            
2 These are severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive 
legitimacy. 
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However, these factors are not binding for NATO and other states, nor are they 
easy to measure. Therefore, arriving at a consensus on whether a cyber-attack 
should be considered as an armed attack is difficult at best. 
In conclusion, under rules of international law, “the NATO charter and the 
United Nations charter there remains general ambiguity as to exactly how an 
incident in cyberspace may be considered an act of war” (Caton, 2016, p. 9). 
Cyber defense policies show that NATO does not prefer to define what kind of 
attacks against the alliance require collective defense and maintains ambiguity 
policy by evaluating cyber incidents case by case. Under these circumstances, 
NATO has developed cyber defense policies and implements them in 
coordination with all members. The question is whether these policy 
enhancements and applications are enough to meet cyber threats against the 
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO RESPOND CYBER 
THREATS 
Even though NATO faced serious attacks during the Kosovo Conflict, it is 
obvious that NATO and member states did not take their lessons and prepare for 
more serious cyber threats. The fact that NATO declarations after the 2004 
Istanbul and 2005 Brussels Summits did not even mention any cyber issues 
(Caton, 2016, p. 85) suggests that NATO ignored cyber defense in those years. 
Estonia was a NATO member when it was targeted in the 2007 cyber-attacks; 
yet, the alliance was not in a position to defend Estonia collectively even if it had 
been asked. A wake-up call from the Estonia case, however, urged NATO to 
establish the CCDCOE (Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence) in 
2008 in Tallinn, Estonia. NATO CCDCOE serves as the headquarters for the 
alliance’s cyber security concerns. The Estonia case demonstrated to NATO that 
as an alliance it did not have sufficient capability and presence in this domain to 
ensure the protection of its member countries in cyberspace (Herzog, 2011). 
The cyber threat landscape rapidly changes, and NATO needs to maintain 
a strong cyber defense. Especially after the Wales Summit in September 2014, 
the organization has made decisive steps to show that robust defense in 
cyberspace is an important part of the “NATO’s core task of collective defense” 
(NATO, 2016f). In coordination with this mindset, NATO has developed cyber 
defense policies and executes them with assistance of all members. 
The main focus of this chapter is answering whether the policy 
enhancements and applications are sufficient to meet cyber threats against the 
NATO alliance, or whether further measures are required. After providing details 
about the Cyber Defense Pledge, which was signed at the Warsaw Summit in 
2016, the chapter describes and evaluates NATO’s cyber policies and operations 
in eight areas. For each area, it offers recommendations for continuing or 
strengthening the current approach.  
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A. CYBER DEFENSE PLEDGE  
NATO members pledged at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 to bolster and 
develop the cyber defenses of their networks and infrastructures. Each member 
will deem “its responsibility to enhance its resilience and capability” to react 
swiftly and “effectively to cyber-attacks, including in hybrid” forms (NATO, 2016f). 
NATO’s official cyber defense pledge text is shown here:  
Cyber Defense Pledge (2016)  
1. In recognition of the new realities of security threats to NATO, 
we, the Allied Heads of State and Government, pledge to ensure 
the Alliance keeps pace with the fast evolving cyber threat 
landscape and that our nations will be capable of defending 
themselves in cyberspace as in the air, on land and at sea.  
2. We reaffirm our national responsibility, in line with Article 3 of the 
Washington Treaty, to enhance the cyber defences of national 
infrastructures and networks, and our commitment to the 
indivisibility of Allied security and collective defence, in accordance 
with the Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence adopted in 
Wales. We will ensure that strong and resilient cyber defences 
enable the Alliance to fulfil its core tasks. Our interconnectedness 
means that we are only as strong as our weakest link. We will work 
together to better protect our networks and thereby contribute to the 
success of Allied operations. 
3. We welcome the work of Allies and the EU on enhancing cyber 
security, which contributes to reinforcing resilience in the Euro-
Atlantic region, and we support further NATO – EU cyber defence 
co-operation, as agreed. We reaffirm the applicability of 
international law in cyberspace and acknowledge the work done in 
relevant international organisations, including on voluntary norms of 
responsible state behaviour and confidence-building measures in 
cyberspace. We recognise the value of NATO’s partnerships with 
partner nations, industry and academia, including through the 
NATO Industry Cyber Partnership. 
4. We emphasise NATO’s role in facilitating co-operation on cyber 
defence including through multinational projects, education, 
training, and exercises and information exchange, in support of 
national cyber defence efforts. We will ensure that our Alliance is 
cyber aware, cyber trained, cyber secure and cyber enabled. 
5. We, Allied Heads of State and Government, pledge to strengthen 
and enhance the cyber defences of national networks and 
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infrastructures, as a matter of priority. Together with the continuous 
adaptation of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities, as part of NATO’s 
long-term adaptation, this will reinforce the cyber defence and 
overall resilience of the Alliance. We will: 
I. Develop the fullest range of capabilities to defend our national 
infrastructures and networks. This includes: addressing cyber 
defence at the highest strategic level within our defence related 
organisations, further integrating cyber defence into operations and 
extending coverage to deployable networks; 
II. Allocate adequate resources nationally to strengthen our cyber 
defence capabilities; 
III. Reinforce the interaction amongst our respective national cyber 
defence stakeholders to deepen co-operation and the exchange of 
best practices; 
IV. Improve our understanding of cyber threats, including the 
sharing of information and assessments; 
V. Enhance skills and awareness, among all defence stakeholders 
at national level, of fundamental cyber hygiene through to the most 
sophisticated and robust cyber defences; 
VI. Foster cyber education, training and exercising of our forces, 
and enhance our educational institutions, to build trust and 
knowledge across the Alliance; 
VII. Expedite implementation of agreed cyber defence 
commitments including for those national systems upon which 
NATO depends. 
6. To track progress on the delivery of our Pledge, we task an 
annual assessment based on agreed metrics, and we will review 
progress at our next summit. (NATO, 2016e) 
B. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC AREAS 
Considering the cyber defense pledge, an evaluation of and 
recommendations for NATO’s cyber defense policies are discussed under eight 
specific areas: cooperation with the European Union; relations with business 
enterprises; information sharing among members; education, training, and 
exercises; capabilities of NCIA; critical infrastructure protection; cyber law and 
legislature; and collective cyber defense (Article 5). 
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1. Cooperation with the European Union (EU) 
This section comprises evaluation of and recommendations for NATO’s 
cooperation with the European Union.  
a. Evaluation 
Besides NATO, the EU has also identified cyber issues as one of the 
crucial threats and challenges it faces (Homan, 2014). The majority of member 
states of the EU have some sort of national intentions to defend critical networks 
and to react to cyber threats (Homan, 2014). The European Cyber Security 
Strategy has three goals: “to strengthen the security and resilience of networks 
and information security systems, to prevent and fight cybercrime, and to 
establish a more coherent cyber security policy across Europe” (Homan, 2014).  
The cross-border nature of cyber threats necessitates focus on powerful 
international cooperation (Homan, 2014). NATO cooperates with pertinent 
countries and organizations to develop international cyber security (NATO, 
2016f). NATO states that “requests for cooperation with the Alliance are handled 
on a case-by-case basis founded on mutual interest” (NATO, 2016f). NATO 
cooperates with “the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)” (NATO, 2016f). 
The 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration urges NATO to work more jointly 
with the EU in the field of cyber defense. Of the 28 NATO members, “all but 
Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United States” are members 
of the EU (Caton, 2016, p. 30), and “these countries share common interests in 
security programs conducted by both organizations as well as the desire not to 
have unnecessary duplication of resource contributions” (p. 31). Considering 
cyber defense, both groups have analogous aims, but divergent approaches. 
Caton (2016) summarizes the analysis by Piret Pernik, researcher at the 
International Center for Defense Studies in Estonia: 
For both NATO and the EU, cyber security is a strategic issue that 
impacts the security and defence of member states and of the 
 69 
organisations themselves. They both prioritize the resilience and 
defence of their own networks, organisations and missions, leaving 
cyber security of individual members states a national 
responsibility. The missions of the two organisations are 
complementary, with NATO focusing on security and defence 
aspects of cyber security, and the EU dealing with a broader, 
mainly non-military range of cyber issues (Internet freedom and 
governance, online rights and data protection), and internal security 
aspects. (p. 31) 
In February 2016, to enhance better cyber defense cooperation, NATO 
signed a Technical Arrangement with the EU (NATO, 2016f). Cooperation 
between NATO and the EU in areas such as critical infrastructure protection is 
crucial; however, unlike NATO, the EU does not give direct technical support to 
its members. Rather, the EU “facilitates information sharing through such 
organizations as the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) and the European Defence Agency (EDA)” (Caton, 2016, p. 31). Other 
noteworthy differences between the EU and NATO are that the former does not 
have “its command and control information systems and it lacks the central 
authority for common cyber security, such as that found in the NAC” (p. 31). 
b. Recommendations 
The “political will in the EU to cooperate further with NATO on cyber 
defense” is an advantage to enhance strong and “resilient cyber defense 
capabilities” (Caton, 2016, p. 32). This is required within the EU Cyber Defense 
Policy Framework, which was adopted by the Council of the EU (p. 32). To avoid 
redundant duplication and establish “coherence and complementarity of efforts,” 
in terms of cyber defense, NATO and the EU should have “regular staff-to-staff 
consultations, cross-briefings, as well as possible meetings between the Politico-
Military Group and relevant NATO committees” (p. 32). 
Both NATO and the EU point out that inadequate cyber security of a 
member state is a national liability. The EU does not have a central authority in 
charge of collective cyber defense, “while in NATO the top political decision-
making body NAC exercises principal decision-making authority” and inspects 
 70 
the development on NATO’s cyber defense position (Caton, 2016, p. 78). 
Compared to the EU, NATO’s structure is more sufficient to deal with cyber 
issues, and encouraging the EU to have similar responsible authorities will also 
boost the alliance’s cyber defense.    
The 2002 Prague Summit declaration shows that NATO was aware of 
cyber issues at the time. However, especially after the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO 
made serious steps in cyber defense development. In contrast, military cyber 
defense in the EU is at a relatively early stage of maturity (Homan, 2014). 
Considering that NATO and the EU have many common member states, both 
organizations should search for ways to reinforce links between them for cyber 
security issues.  
Some states among these common members are relatively well 
developed in their technological competence and internal structures for dealing 
with cyber issues, while others are less advanced. Furthermore, “in terms of 
technical, legal and political harmonized measures, there are still significant 
differences between individual member states and EU institutions” (Homan, 
2014), as it is the case in NATO alliance. Considering the proverb that a chain is 
only as strong as its weakest link, both NATO and the EU should find ways to 
develop their weaker members. In this aspect, NATO members signed the 
aforementioned Cyber Pledge, and NATO should encourage the EU and its 
members to adopt similar goals and promises. In this way, both organizations will 
have similar goals and approaches in terms of cyber defense. 
2. Relations with Business Enterprises 
This section comprises evaluation of and recommendations for NATO’s 
relations with business enterprises.   
a. Evaluation 
For an effective cyber defense of NATO and its member countries, 
relations with private sector and business enterprises are crucial for exploiting 
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technological expertise and innovations in cyberspace (NATO, 2016f). NATO 
started a formal initiative in September 2014 to increase the cooperation efforts 
between NATO and the private sector on cyber challenges and threats. NATO 
and the allied countries are trying to improve and strengthen the relationship with 
private industry by the help of the NICP. NICP was presented to 1,500 policy 
makers and business leaders in the cyber conference held in 2014 in Mons, 
Belgium (NATO, 2014a). The partnership between NATO and the private sector 
is through existing structures of NATO and includes national Computer 
Emergency Response Teams, NATO allied countries’ private sector 
representatives, and other NATO entities (NATO, 2016f).  
There are many areas where NATO and industry work together, including 
education and training, information sharing activities, exercises, and multinational 
Smart Defense projects (NATO, 2016f). NICP’s objectives are to “improve cyber 
security in NATO’s defence supply chain,” “raise mutual understanding and 
awareness of cyber threats and risks, including through information sharing;” 
“contribute to the Alliance’s efforts in cyber defence education, training and 
exercises;” “improve sharing of best practices and expertise on preparedness 
and recovery;” and “help NATO and Allies to learn from industry” (NATO, 2014a, 
para. 4).  
Another significant event for NATO and private industry cooperation was 
the Global Conference on Cyberspace held in The Hague, the Netherlands, in 
2015. This conference helped government representatives, civil society, and the 
private sector to increase cooperation in cyberspace and improve cyber 
capabilities against any kind of cyber threat (NATO, 2015). The themes that 
dominated this conference were “building the trust to work collaboratively in order 
to understand cyber risks, raise situational awareness, and improve cyber 
protection;” “facilitating actionable information sharing between NATO and 
Industry;” and “advancing innovation by identifying the next cutting-edge cyber 
security solutions, promoting small business participation, and enabling 
application of most innovative technologies” (NATO, 2015, para. 3). The urgency 
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for advances in cooperation between NATO and business enterprises was 
emphasized in this conference, and enhancing cyber resilience, mitigating 
vulnerability against cyber threats, and improving incident handling were 
addressed as significant issues for a better cooperation (NATO, 2015). 
A good example of how NATO builds partnerships with the private sector 
is the information sharing agreement with Leidos (NATO, 2016b). The agreement 
enables both parties to collaborate better and share non-classified information in 
a timely manner so that they can protect their information infrastructures and 
networks and enhance their situational awareness about cyber threats. This 
sharing will improve NATO’s prevention and detection processes. Officials 
considered the agreement with Leidos as “an important part of the effort to 
bolster the Alliance’s cyber defence posture through the NATO Industry Cyber 
Partnership (NICP)” (NATO, 2016b, para. 5). 
Another important event for the NATO-Industry collaboration was the 2016 
NATO C4ISR Industry Conference and AFCEA TechNet International (NITEC16) 
(NATO, 2016d). At this conference, the significance of building closer 
relationships and partnerships between NATO and private industry was 
reemphasized in order to stay ahead of cyber threats and deliver effective 
methods for the alliance’s cyber defense (NATO, 2016d). The conference lasted 
for two days, with the first day dedicated to discussing the need for partnership, 
and the second, to discussing ways for building stronger collaboration and 
partnerships (NATO, 2016d). 
b. Recommendations 
The realization of the importance of NATO collaborating with private 
industry in cyberspace is a big step towards bolstering the alliance’s cyber 
defense. Even though some efforts for cooperation with industry started earlier, 
the official initiative came with the establishment of NICP in 2014. Considering 
the seriousness of cyber threats and cyber-attacks against NATO, as discussed 
in previous chapters, this initiative could have been launched earlier.  
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The efforts through NICP helped the alliance to build very strong 
relationships with some enterprises in the industry. This brought a more scientific 
and civilian perspective to the cyber defense issues that increased the versatility 
of methods and ideas for protecting NATO’s existence in cyber realm. However, 
these efforts do not seem adequate to integrate a very large organization like 
NATO with numerous successful enterprises in the industry. Therefore, more 
efforts and developments are needed to enhance the cooperation, collaboration, 
and the partnership between NATO and private industry. 
3. Information Sharing Among Members 
This section comprises evaluation of and recommendations for NATO’s 
information sharing among members.   
a. Evaluation 
After 2002, NATO and some of its members invested significant resources 
in the defense of their networks. However, “Allies that have invested heavily in 
cyber capabilities worry that others might benefit without making a similar 
investment themselves” (Veenendaal, Kaska, & Brangetto, 2016). Therefore, 
these allies remain reluctant to join any serious discussion on the role of cyber 
capacities in military operations within NATO (Veenendaal et al., 2016). In 
addition, the sensitivity of cyber issues for states hinders information sharing 
among members within NATO. Nevertheless, having recognized the concerns, 
the allies have pledged to develop information-sharing and collective assistance 
in blocking, alleviating, and “recovering from cyber-attacks” (NATO, 2016f). 
NATO has made great efforts to increase information sharing. For 
example, “in April 2015, the Portuguese Ministry of Defence hosted the first 
Cyber Defence Smart Defence Projects’ Conference,” and in addition to sessions 
related to cooperation with businesses and academia, the conference included 
three project presentations (Caton, 2016, p. 15). The first project was led by 
Belgium and named “the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP), an 
initiative to ‘facilitate information sharing of the technical characteristics of 
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malware within a trusted community without having to share details of an attack’” 
(p. 15). This platform was initially developed to assist NCIRC Technical Center 
work but is now available to all NATO members (p. 15). Caton (2016) describes 
MISP as follows: 
MISP – Malware Information Sharing Platform is a combination of a 
community of members, a knowledge base on malware, and a web-
based platform. It is a practical and successful instantiation of the 
Smart Defence concept and is fully coherent with all current NATO 
Cyber Defence information sharing initiatives. 
It combines a searchable repository with a multidirectional 
information sharing mechanism. Where possible, MISP also 
provides automation mechanisms that enable the automatic import 
and export of data and the interfacing with other systems. The aim 
is to speed up the detection of incidents and the production of 
defence countermeasures, especially for malware that is not 
blocked by anti-virus protection, or that is part of sophisticated 
targeted intrusion attempts. (p. 52) 
The second project, Multinational Cyber Defense Capability Development 
(MN CD2), started in March 2013 and is led by the “Netherlands teamed with 
Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Romania”; the goal of the project is to 
“cooperate on the development of improved means of sharing technical 
information; shared awareness of threats and attacks; and advanced cyber 
defence sensors” (Caton, 2016, p. 15). One of the four first work packages of MN 
CD2 is Technical Information Sharing, and Caton (2016) describes the relevance 
of this package to NATO operations: 
The objective of this work package is to deliver a capability for the 
efficient exchange of unclassified, but potentially sensitive, cyber 
defence technical information related to incidents, threats and 
vulnerabilities amongst national Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams (CSIRTs).The project enables the participating 
Nations to build on previous NATO work in the development of 
national capabilities. The development of this capability through a 
multinational project has reduced its overall cost per nation. (p.52)  
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The third project is Multinational Cyber Defense Education and Training 
(MN CD E&T). Although this topic may be considered as a part of information 
sharing, it is covered separately in the next section.  
b. Recommendations 
As Matthijs Veenendaal, Kadri Kaska, and Pascal Brangetto (2016) note, 
cyber capabilities are still regarded as strategic assets by most states. Because 
of the secrecy of these capabilities, states are reluctant to delegate the authority 
to use them, particularly in offensive operations. For instance, in the United 
States, “only the President can approve a cyber-attack likely to result in 
‘significant consequences.’ However, this does not mean that these capabilities 
are irrelevant to NATO and NATO-led operations” (Veenendaal et al., 2016). 
NATO must plan for the “contingency of nations wanting to deploy them during a 
NATO-led military operation” (Veenendaal et al., 2016). However, without 
information sharing and knowing the level of possible contribution of an allied 
member, it will be very difficult to plan for possible cyber scenarios and react 
swiftly to cyber-attacks against NATO and its members.  
Handling “the need for secrecy or political sensitivity concerning specific 
military operations is not new for the Alliance” (Veenendaal et al., 2016). To 
enhance a full-fledged cyber doctrine, it would be beneficial to check the NATO 
Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. It states in its introduction that 
special operations  
may be described as military activities conducted by specially 
designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces using 
operational tactics, techniques, and modes of employment not 
standard to conventional forces. Politico-military considerations 
may require low prominence, covert or discreet techniques, and the 
acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated 
with conventional operations. (Veenendaal et al., 2016)   
The approach for special operations is applicable for NATO to develop 
information sharing among members for cyber operations. NATO has the 
capacity to develop a sound doctrine, which deals with unconventional small 
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sized units depending on secret information and conducting clandestine 
operations. Countries hesitate to share information because of their 
vulnerabilities in the cyber domain; however, if NATO becomes a more powerful 
cyber actor, willingness to share information among members will increase, and 
the bonds of NATO members will strengthen. 
4. Education, Training, and Exercises 
This section comprises evaluation of and recommendations for NATO’s 
education, training, and exercises. 
a. Evaluation 
Education, training, and exercises make a very important contribution to 
the alliance’s cyber defense capabilities. The significance of cyber education, 
training, and exercises was addressed in the NATO Cyber Defense Pledge 2016. 
We emphasize NATO’s role in facilitating co-operation on cyber 
defence including through multinational projects, education, 
training, and exercises and information exchange, in support of 
national cyber defence efforts. We will ensure that our Alliance is 
cyber aware, cyber trained, cyber secure and cyber enabled. Foster 
cyber education, training and exercising of our forces, and enhance 
our educational institutions, to build trust and knowledge across the 
Alliance. (NATO, 2016e, para. 4) 
The CCDCOE is one of NATO’s primary components for cyber education, 
training, and exercises. It is located in Tallinn, Estonia, and was established in 
2008 by the memorandum of understanding signed by Spain, Italy, Germany, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovak Republic. The vision of CCDCOE is “to 
enhance cooperative cyber defence capabilities of NATO and NATO nations, 
thus improving the cyber defence” (Caton, 2016, p. 17). In addition to the various 
missions of CCDCOE, the focus is on NATO’s education, training, exercises, and 
research projects and programs on cyber defense.  
Education and training on cyber defense related issues in NATO occurs at 
multiple levels (Caton, 2016). Strategic level cyber defense issues that have a 
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broader focus are discussed at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. This 
college hosts some forums about cyber security, and publishes research papers 
on cyber defense and works on doctrine developments. The NATO School, 
which is located in Oberammergau, Germany, provides operational level courses 
and support to the network security personnel and staff officers in NATO. The 
NATO Joint Warfare Center is responsible for operational and joint cyber training 
among the headquarters of the alliance. The NATO Communications and 
Information Systems School gives several courses to staff personnel and 
communication and information systems operators. To test the level of 
knowledge and skills acquired from these educational training efforts, the Cyber 
Range run by the Estonian Defense Forces serves as a great establishment for 
cyber defense exercises.  
The cyber defense exercises fall into two categories. The first category of 
exercises is specific to cyber operations, while the second is integrated into 
existing NATO exercises (Caton, 2016). The biggest cyber defense exercise in 
NATO is the Cyber Coalition series, which started in 2008 and is conducted 
annually. Cyber Coalition 2014 hosted “over 600 technical, government, and 
cyber experts operating from dozens of locations from across the Alliance and 
partner nations as well as observers from academia and industry” (Caton, 2016, 
p. 23). Cyber Coalition 2014 also “provided a stage for exercising strategic and 
operational level information sharing, senior level decision making, and multi-
disciplined coordination in the cyber realm amongst 26 Allied and five partner 
nations participating” (Caton, 2016, p. 23). 
CCDCOE also sponsors other exercises like Locked Shields, an annual 
cyber defense exercise that began in 2010 (Caton, 2016). In Locked Shields 
2015, 16 countries and more than 400 players participated. Scenarios similar to 
cases like the Estonia attacks in 2007 have been conducted in the exercises so 
that NATO can develop action plans and learn from its experiences in order to 
fight any possible cyber threat in the future.   
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NATO also integrates cyber defenses in its other large exercises. For 
instance, in the Steadfast Juncture 2011 exercise, the NATO Joint Warfare 
Center integrated cyber defense activities into the exercise, so that battle staffs 
could reach a better understanding of the effects of cyber-attacks in an operation 
(Caton, 2016). The cyber-attack injections were made in three target categories 
by the designers of the exercise: “NATO command and control (e.g., computer 
networks); NATO operations (e.g., airports, seaports, petroleum, electricity); and 
NATO mission stability (e.g., energy, medical, financial, transportation, 
communication)” (Caton, 2016, p. 24). Cyber defense activities have been a part 
of other exercises as well, including Steadfast Jazz 2013; Coalition Warrior 
Interoperability Exploration, Experimentation, Examination Exercise; and Trident 
Juncture 2015, the largest exercise NATO conducted since 2002.  
A project called Multinational Cyber Defense Education and Training (MN 
CD E&T) aims to improve professional development and cyber defense 
personnel’s certification, develop cyber education courses, and provide cyber 
range support (Caton, 2016).The Connected Forces Initiative was established to 
enhance the interoperability and interconnectivity of the allied forces (Caton, 
2016). These programs help NATO Forces reach their 2020 goal: “a coherent set 
of deployable, interoperable and sustainable forces equipped, trained, exercised 
and commanded to operate together and with partners in any environment” 
(Caton, 2016, p. 16).  
b. Recommendations 
According to Caton (2016), “NATO has established robust education, 
training and exercise programs that include dedicated cyber exercises as well as 
ones integrated into large-scale exercises addressing both the political and 
military aspects of crisis management” (p. 37). It is apparent that NATO has been 
investing remarkable time, effort, and funds for the alliance’s education, training, 
and exercise programs to develop a stronger cyber defense against any threats. 
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The momentum in this field has significantly increased after the establishment of 
CCDCOE with a more focused attention. 
Cyber operations are strongly tied to highly educated and skilled human 
resources. Therefore, competing with adversaries in this domain depends on the 
quality of the personnel working in the cyber defense force. There needs to be an 
education and training policy that could keep itself up-to-date with every 
development happening in current technology in information and computer 
systems. NATO seems to be achieving this renewal feature through CCDCOE 
and by conducting cyber defense exercises. 
5. Capabilities of NCIA 
This section comprises evaluation of and recommendations for capabilities 
of NCIA. 
a. Evaluation 
The NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) was 
established in 2012 by merging NATO Headquarters Information and 
Communication Technology Service, NATO Communication and Information 
Systems Service Agency, NATO C3 Organization, NATO Air Command and 
Control System Management Agency, and NATO Consultation (NATO, 2016a). 
NCIA serves as “NATO’s principal Consultation, Command, and Control (C3) 
deliverer and Communications and Information Systems (CIS) provider” (NATO, 
2016a, para. 1). NCIA also provides technical support to NATO Command 
Structure, Headquarters, and Agencies. NCIA is “the executive arm of the NATO 
Communication and Information Organisation, which aims to achieve maximum 
effectiveness in delivering C3 capabilities  to stakeholders, while ensuring their 
coherence and interoperability, and ensuring the provision of secure CIS services 
at minimum cost to Allies—individually and collectively” (NATO, 2016a, para. 5). 
NCIA helps identify and address new challenges and threats like cyber 
and missile defense; provides Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
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Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies to support 
the alliance’s decision-making mechanism; and delivers communication and 
information services (NATO, 2016a).  
NCIA promotes interoperability, includes system and architecture 
engineering and design, technology acquisition, technical support and testing 
(NATO, 2016a). Additionally, NCIA provides implementation and configuration 
management, system engineering, and central planning to the NATO Air 
Command and Control System Programme (NATO, 2016a). One of the most 
important things that NCIA conducts is “cooperative sharing and exchange of 
information between and among NATO and other Allied bodies using 
interoperable national and NATO support systems” (NATO, 2016a, para. 4). 
NCIA offers several important advantages to the alliance. It provides 
benefits “from the economies of scale” in the acquisition of C4ISR systems; “cost 
competitive provision and maintenance” for the allied countries’ purposes; “multi-
year programmes of work” by bilateral frameworks between NATO systems and 
national requirements; “robust programme, portfolio, and project management” 
for complex and large scale C4ISR acquisitions; “reuse of C4ISR infrastructure 
and application services” within NATO cyber defense capabilities; “collective and 
individual education and training” with a wide range of specializations; 
“independent test and validation” for communication and information systems; 
and “subject matter expertise support” covering various fields and topics (NATO, 
2016g). 
b. Recommendations 
NCIA has been conducting a comprehensive and visionary approach to 
the alliance’s communication and information systems capabilities. The policies 
implemented, education and training initiatives, interoperability efforts and 
technical support within the organization have developed NATO’s cyber outlook 
in a positive and strong way.  
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Even though there have been many attempts and projects related to 
information sharing and interoperability issues conducted by the NCIA, the 
progress within the alliance could still be improved. Every nation should promote 
cooperation and information sharing in the cyber realm in order to strengthen 
NATO’s collective and individual cyber defense capabilities. 
6. Critical Infrastructure Protection 
This section comprises evaluation of and recommendations for NATO’s 
critical infrastructure protection. 
a. Evaluation 
Almost all states face the risk of a nightmare scenario in which the daily 
life of people is crippled by the devastating effects of a cyber-attack. A plausible 
scenario could be as follows:  
Imagine that a coordinated cyber-attack inserts malicious software 
into the computer networks of private companies operating national 
critical infrastructure, shutting down transportation, water and other 
critical systems. The ensuing havoc sees trains derail, including 
one carrying industrial chemicals that explode into a toxic cloud. 
Water treatment plants shut down, contaminating drinking water 
and causing many to fall ill. (NATO, 2012) 
This may be a nightmare scenario, but it is possible. Finding ways to avert 
such incidents and discussing NATO’s duty in guarding members’ critical 
infrastructures “was the theme of the annual Emerging Security Challenges 
Conference on 10 December 2012” (NATO, 2012). 
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is a complex and interconnected 
challenge for both members of NATO and the alliance (Caton, 2016, p. 36). Even 
at the national level, coordinating and integrating the domestic government 
approaches is challenging. For example, the United States is among those 
nations striving to enhance and preserve a national cyberspace security “that is 
coordinated across federal, state, and local government” (p. 36).  
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At the international level, securing critical infrastructures is more painful 
and requires immense efforts. “To face such wide-ranging threats and 
challenges, no single organisation can work in isolation,” and a comprehensive 
approach, “involving a myriad of international and national organisations, public-
private partnerships and academia, is required” (NATO, 2012). Although CIP is 
an individual state responsibility, the alliance represents an added value in 
reinforcing the “prevention, resilience and response capabilities” of NATO 
members. In terms of this approach, “the Rome Atlantic Forum3 marks an 
important step forward towards greater awareness of a particularly topical 
security concern” (Caton, 2016, p. 67). 
Even though conferences and forums have been held to discuss how to 
deal with critical infrastructure protection in cyberspace, the NATO policies and 
its support to members are not adequate to handle this issue.     
b. Recommendations 
Before anything else, NATO should evaluate the scope and terms for CIP, 
determine the common definition of critical infrastructure to distinguish the most 
valuable assets, and scrutinize individual as well as common vulnerabilities 
(Caton, 2016, pp. 50–51). After that, NATO should clearly assign responsibilities 
of CIP to the various stakeholders at the state and global level as well as in “the 
private business community” (Caton, 2016, p. 51). 
On the other hand, to increase cyber defense capacity, states with greater 
capabilities should assist less capable states “with the establishment, transfer, 
training, and support of key cyber capabilities” (Kramer, Butler, & Lotrionte, 
2016). Among these capabilities, the focus should be on “the protection of 
military networks, telecommunications infrastructure, and the electrical grid” and 
                                            
3 The Rome Atlantic Forum on NATO and the Future of Cyber Security was organized 
by the Italian Atlantic Committee at the NATO Defense College on December 2, 2013. 
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providing “an offensive capability to be utilized as authorized including as part of 
an integrated defense in a conflict” (Kramer et al., 2016).  
To achieve this effectively, NATO should first establish an information-
sharing mechanism and “create ‘cyber framework nations,’ each of which could 
help support national capabilities, including the establishment, transfer, training, 
and support of necessary cyber capabilities” in accordance with the “framework 
nation concept approved by NATO at the 2014 Wales summit” (Kramer et al., 
2016). For example, the United States would be one of the cyber framework 
nations, which “could help a less cyber-capable ally establish an effective 
intrusion protection system, provide forensic support, and develop resilience 
capabilities” to be used in the event of cyber-attack to a critical infrastructure 
(Kramer et al., 2016). 
Moreover, NATO should build operational partnerships with crucial private 
actors, such as Internet service providers and power grid operators. For instance, 
the military, telecommunication companies, and “electrical grid operators could 
create, in advance, capabilities that would mitigate a Tier V or VI attack4“ 
(Kramer et al., 2016).  
Finally, the alliance should develop doctrine and skills to support 
“the effective use of cyberspace in a conflict as part of NATO’s warfighting 
capabilities.” For example, cyber tools have a potential to disrupt an enemy’s 
“communications, logistics, and sensors or be utilized as part of a defense of 
critical infrastructures” (Kramer et al., 2016). Even though it is not officially 
accepted, Russia has benefited from the use of hybrid techniques in various 
cases, such as Georgia and Ukraine. NATO should also be able to carry out 
similar operations.  
                                            
4 “A Tier V-VI capability is of such magnitude and sophistication that it could not be defended 
against. As such, a defense-only strategy against this threat is insufficient” to defend national 
interests and is “impossible to execute” (Wellen, 2013, para. 5). 
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7. Cyber Law and Legislature 
This section comprises evaluation of and recommendations for cyber law 
and legislature. 
a. Evaluation 
Dunlap (2011) argues that “in any event, ‘act of war’ is a political phrase, 
not a legal term. It might be said that the United Nations Charter was designed, 
in essence, to ban ‘war’ from the lexicon of nations” (p. 85). Especially, Article 2 
of the Charter prohibits all threats and employment of “force,” while Article 51 
enables the use of force only in responding to a certain type of attack, 
particularly, an “armed attack.” The self-defense arrangement of Article 51 often 
puzzles cyber strategists and their attorneys (p. 85). According to Michael N. 
Schmitt, “all armed attacks are ‘uses of force [within the meaning of Article 2], but 
not all uses of force qualify as armed attacks’ that are a prerequisite to an armed 
response” (p. 85). 
As Arquilla (2013) states, cyberspace is complex and difficult to control, 
and “it seems that Hobbes’s view of wars of ‘all against all’ is more likely to obtain 
than Rousseau’s notions about the possibility of harmony, even nobility prevailing 
on the electronic frontier. With conflict inevitable, the need for a deeper, fresher 
understanding of war ethics only grows” (p. 85). 
How to apply existing international law to cyber activities is a continuing 
issue within NATO and the global community. To clarify this issue, Caton (2016) 
mentions two CCDCOE sponsored publications: 
From a security perspective, significant progress was made with 
the publication of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare in 2013, the culmination of a 3-year 
collaborative effort sponsored by the CCDCOE. The Tallinn Manual 
was preceded by the publication of International Cyber Incidents: 
Legal Considerations, an earlier study by the CCDCOE that 
includes case studies on four high-visibility cyber-attacks: Estonia 
2007; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2008; Lithuania 2008; and 
Georgia 2008. (p. 29) 
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The Tallinn Manual, which is based widely on Michael Schmitt’s work, 
represents a model for assessing “the severity level of cyber conflict” (Caton, 
2016, p. 30). It is not a surprise that some non-NATO states, especially Russia 
and China, do not fully acknowledge the principles advocated within the Tallinn 
Manual (p. 30). Margarita Levin Jaitner (2015) states that Russian officials and 
scholars treat information as a form and source of immense power. While the 
West considers cyber security and information security as two different realms, 
for Russia “cyber is subordinate to information security” (p. 88). This kind of 
fundamental difference negatively affects the possibility of agreement. Since 
Russia and China are two permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC), expecting the UNSC to accept the principles of the Tallinn 
Manual is a significant challenge (Caton, 2016, p. 30). 
The Tallinn Manual deals with “cyber warfare amongst state actors at 
levels that comprise armed attacks.” As a follow-on, a CCDCOE team is currently 
working on “how international law applies to less severe malevolent activity in 
cyberspace” (Caton, 2016, p. 30). The project, known as “Tallinn 2.0,” focuses on 
aggression below the threshold of an armed attack. The results are expected to 
be published in 2016 (p. 30). Tallinn 2.0 also scrutinizes “how the general 
principles of international law, such as sovereignty, jurisdiction, due diligence and 
the prohibition of intervention, apply in the cyber context” (p. 76). 
In addition to publications, the CCDCOE also sponsors courses and 
workshops that promote understanding the details of legal issues in terms of 
cyber conflict (Caton, 2016, p. 30). Overall, NATO is performing successfully and 
contributing great efforts in the realm of cyber law and legislature. 
b. Recommendations 
Globally, NATO is in the leading position in building standards for legal 
assessment of activities in cyberspace (Caton, 2016, p. 40). NATO should strive 
to find ways to have consensus on international cyber law standards with 
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especially two strong state actors, Russia and China, because they have veto 
power in the UNSC.  
On the other hand, NATO has strong ties with the private sector, and 
significant legal issues emerge related to “the status of the private contractors’ 
civilian employees who support NATO operations” (Caton, 2016, p. 30). NATO 
should consider and evaluate the liability and vulnerability of these civilians 
during cyber operations against the alliance or conducted by NATO. 
8. Collective Cyber Defense (Article 5) 
This section comprises evaluation of and recommendations for NATO’s 
collective cyber defense. 
a. Evaluation 
One of the most discussed issues in the international arena after the 9/11 
attacks was the Digital Disaster scenario that could be experienced in a member 
country (Bicakci, 2014). Many countries have incorporated cyber security 
strategies in their national security strategies in order to address cyber-attacks 
that could threaten the state. The role of NATO in the case of a serious cyber-
attack against a member country has been a conundrum. 
Due to the difficulty of attributing a cyber-attack, NATO appears to have a 
pragmatic cyber security posture that handles each attack on a case-by-case 
basis (Burton, 2015). However, NATO officially stated that “NATO will consider 
(and potentially implement) a collective Article 5 response to cyber-attacks 
against NATO members, just as it did in response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11” 
(Burton, 2015, p. 308). Nevertheless, the threshold for the cyber-attacks that 
could invoke Article 5 is not certain. The head of NATO’s Emerging Security 
Challenges division, Jamie Shea stated that “[w]e are keeping that ambiguous so 
a potential aggressor does not get the idea they can carry out cyber-attacks up to 
a certain level with impunity” (Ashford, 2014, para. 8). Even though setting a 
specific and certain threshold would make it easier for NATO to determine when 
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to invoke Article 5 against a cyber-attack, keeping it ambiguous gives an 
advantageous flexibility to the alliance regardless of the attack or adversary 
(Jones, 2015).  
Article 5 was purposely left vague to give NATO more flexibility to assess 
a threat and determine a response. Therefore, it is also uncertain what kind of a 
response NATO would give against a cyber-attack. Would it be a cyber or a 
kinetic operation against the adversary if Article 5 were triggered? The answer to 
this question is deliberately left ambiguous, reinforcing NATO’s position that it will 
evaluate cyber-attacks on case-by-case basis. 
b. Recommendations 
NATO’s collective defense role against cyber threats is a difficult topic due 
to its complexity. However, NATO needs to defend itself and its members in 
every domain including the cyber. Therefore, letting adversaries know that Article 
5 could be invoked in case of a serious cyber-attack is a significant policy and 
resolution in the alliance’s cyber defense. Jones (2015) summarizes the actions 
that NATO should take to build a better collective defense against cyber threats 
and have effective and reliable Article 5 execution in order to deter the 
adversaries very well. First, he states that “as part of its cyber defense program, 
NATO should establish an early warning system that lets the alliance and its 
members know when an attack is happening within enough time to stop it” (p. 
45). This would give the alliance a further notice before a cyber-attack leads to a 
cyber conflict. Second, “NATO’s deterrence strategy should focus more on 
denial” (p. 45), because deterrence by denial will result in adversary’s 
abandonment of the action, and threat of punishment is not effective due to the 
attribution problems. Third, “NATO and its allies should encourage information 
sharing among its member nations and within the alliance itself” (p. 45) because 
transparency is one of the most significant aspects of a successful cyber defense 
for the Alliance. Fourth, “NATO needs to hire or train a team of experts in 
hacking, computer forensics, and cyber defense to aid its own organization and 
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come to the aid of member countries that have experienced a breach in their 
security networks” (p. 47). Therefore, cooperation and information sharing is one 
of the most significant and essential assets in fighting against the cyber threats to 
defend the alliance in the cyber realm. Finally, “NATO should maintain ambiguity 
for justifying an Article 5 response in order to ensure that NATO can act when 
justified” (p. 45). This could give NATO flexibility and windows of opportunity 
when evaluating a cyber-attack and attributing it to an adversary. 
C. SUMMARY 
NATO’s cyber defense readiness could be evaluated by comparing cyber 
threats with the alliance’s capabilities in cyberspace, including its policies and 
applications. NATO has gone through a significant evolution in its cyber defense 
policies within the last decade. NATO members signed a Cyber Defense Pledge 
at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 that clearly demonstrated the organization’s 
resolution and unity against any adversary that could threaten NATO or any of its 
members, and its willingness to cooperate fully in the cyber realm.  
After examining the cyber threats against NATO and its policies in the 
previous chapters, this chapter analyzed policy recommendations for NATO 
regarding cyber threats. Here we conclude with a few observations. First, NATO 
has made considerable effort to cooperate with the EU in the cyber realm. 
Political will for enhancing the cooperation has always been positive between the 
two organizations and there have been many developments to strengthen this 
mutual assistance. Second, NATO has tried to build strong relations with 
business enterprises and private industry, because NATO has realized that 
cooperating and integrating with private industry in cyberspace would provide 
significant advantages to the alliance. Third, information sharing among 
members has been a controversial issue due to security and confidentiality 
concerns. However, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Therefore, 
NATO has encouraged nations to share their knowledge and capabilities in the 
cyber realm in order to build a stronger cyber defense as an alliance. Fourth, 
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NATO has always emphasized developing education, training, and exercises to 
increase readiness of the organization in the cyber domain against any kind of 
cyber threat. Therefore, CCDCOE was established and has been serving to 
accomplish this mission. 
Fifth, the NATO Communications and Information Agency provided 
interoperability initiatives within the alliance, education and training efforts, and 
technical support that have enabled NATO’s cyber outlook to change in a very 
positive way. Sixth, critical infrastructure protection is a crucial issue for the 
organization’s cyber security. Therefore, NATO has been investing considerable 
time and effort in this area as well. Seventh, no international actor can conduct 
an act without considering the international laws and obligations or its sanctions. 
Hence, NATO needs to take into consideration this fact as well when 
implementing cyber policies and conducting cyber operations because cyber law 
and legislation cannot break international law. Finally, NATO has clearly 
expressed that cyber-attacks could invoke Article 5 and the alliance could 
respond to an adversary as decided by consensus. However, execution of this 
policy brings some advantages and challenges to both NATO and its members. 
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As a military alliance, NATO is under numerous threats in cyberspace. To 
promote a better understanding of these threats, several cases and incidents 
were discussed in Chapter III of this thesis. Cyber actors may continue to use 
traditional methods, or they may develop unprecedented tactics. Cyber defense 
policies show that NATO does not prefer to define what kind of attacks against 
the alliance require collective defense and instead maintains a policy of 
ambiguity. Under these circumstances, NATO has developed cyber defense 
policies and implements them in coordination with all members. In Chapter V, the 
sufficiency of these policy enhancements and applications was evaluated and 
possible recommendations were discussed. In this concluding chapter, a 
summary of these recommendations, considerations, and suggestions for future 
research are discussed.     
A. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this part, the summary of recommendations is presented under eight 
specific areas. To promote a better understanding of the evaluation and 
recommendations, refer to Chapter V for more details.  
NATO has put a lot of effort into cooperating with the EU on cyber issues. 
Considering that NATO and the EU have many common member states, both 
organizations should search for more ways to strengthen bonds between them in 
terms of cyber defense.  
 NATO should have mutual consultations, briefings, and meetings 
with the EU. 
 NATO should encourage the EU to make structural changes and 
determine responsible authorities for cyber defense, such as NAC 
and other authorities under NAC.  
 Because a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, both NATO 
and the EU should find ways to develop their weaker members.  
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 NATO should encourage the EU to adopt similar goals and 
promises as in the NATO’s Cyber Defense Pledge. 
NATO wants to build strong relations with business enterprises and 
private industry because cooperating and integrating with the private sector 
provides significant advantages to the alliance. 
 The alliance’s efforts do not seem adequate to integrate a very 
large organization like NATO with many enterprises in the industry. 
Therefore, more efforts need to be made to enhance the 
cooperation, collaboration, and the partnership. 
Information sharing among members is a controversial issue because of 
the security and confidentiality concerns. However, NATO has the capacity to 
develop a sound doctrine, which deals with unconventional small sized units 
depending on secret information and conducting clandestine operations. 
 NATO should adopt the approach for special operations because 
this approach will enable the development of information sharing for 
cyber operations.  
NATO focuses on developing education, training, and exercises to 
increase readiness of the alliance in the cyber domain. Therefore, it established 
the CCDCOE, which has been serving to achieve this mission. 
 NATO should have an education and training policy that could keep 
itself up-to-date, and currently, NATO is achieving this through 
CCDCOE and testing its capabilities in cyber defense exercises. 
NATO Communications and Information Agency has contributed 
interoperability initiatives, education and training efforts, and technical support 
that enabled changes in NATO’s cyber outlook in a very positive way. 
 Even though NCIA has undertaken many attempts at information 
sharing and at resolving interoperability issues, more progress is 
needed within the alliance.  
 Each member should promote cooperation and information sharing 
in cyberspace to boost NATO’s collective and individual cyber 
defense capabilities through NCIA. 
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Critical infrastructure protection is a vital issue for the alliance’s cyber 
security. Therefore, NATO has been investing a large amount of time and effort 
in this area. 
 NATO should evaluate the scope and terms for CIP and determine 
the common definition of critical infrastructure.  
 NATO should explicitly designate responsibilities of CIP to the 
various stakeholders. 
 Members with greater capabilities should assist less capable 
members in key cyber capabilities. 
 NATO should create “cyber framework nations,” such as the United 
States, in coordination with the “framework nation concept” adopted 
at the 2014 Wales Summit.  
 NATO should build operational partnerships with crucial private 
actors, such as Internet service providers and power grid operators.  
 NATO should develop doctrine and skills to support the active use 
of cyberspace as part of the alliance’s warfighting capabilities.  
All actors in cyberspace should conduct their operations under 
international law. Globally, NATO is in the leading position in building standards 
for legal assessment of activities in cyberspace.  
 NATO should strive to find ways to have consensus on international 
cyber law standards with Russia and China. 
 NATO should consider and assess the liability and vulnerability of 
civilians who work for private contractors during cyber operations.  
NATO has clearly announced that cyber-attacks could trigger Article 5 and 
that the alliance could respond collectively.  
 NATO should found an early warning system.  
 NATO’s cyber deterrence strategy should depend more on denial. 
 NATO should encourage information sharing.  
 NATO should employ or train a group of experts for various 
important cyber missions.  




While adopting and implementing cyber defense policies, authorities 
should create flexible and dynamic solutions without harming Internet freedom 
(Bicakci, 2014). However, this is not easy because some illegal groups can also 
benefit from this freedom. For example, Daesh (also known as ISIS) and similar 
terrorist groups can conduct secret operations internationally thanks to 
communication enabled by applications that use end-to-end encryption, such as 
TextSecure, Telegram, and WhatsApp. In addition, they can recruit many people 
from all over the world through the Internet. These trends create new threats and 
challenges to Internet freedom. 
There are no common definitions for many terms in international relations 
such as terrorism, refugee, special operations, cybercrime, and cyberwar. NATO 
should realize that it would be very challenging to enact cyber-related 
international rules because it is difficult enough to have consensus on the issue 
within a country, let alone in an alliance like NATO and on a global scale, without 
even a common terminology.  
On the other hand, after 9/11 the security understanding has changed 
completely. The world has changed, as have the threats to the homeland and 
internationally. Terrorist groups have become stronger and more resilient. For 
example, in addition to serious cyber activities, Daesh has shown its ability to 
seize cities and defend those places against many strong militaries. We have not 
seen cyber 9/11 yet. However, certain events have foreshadowed the possibility. 
The Estonian, Georgian, Ukrainian, and Stuxnet incidents have shown that 
cyber-attacks can create immense disruption.  
It is a fact that NATO does not prioritize cyberspace activities as its num-
ber one concern, and cyber defense efforts “must compete for resources with 
other operations and initiatives within NATO” (Caton, 2016, p. 41). This does not 
mean cyber issues are not important for NATO, only that the complexity of world 
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politics and scarcity of resources limit how much NATO can accomplish in cyber 
defense.  
Overall, even though the cyber domain is a challenging arena in which to 
carry out operations and develop policies, NATO can be considered successful in 
cyberspace. However, the alliance should be aware that there is no limit to 
development, especially in terms of cyber defense issues.  
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In several parts of this thesis, NATO’s cyber deterrence came into play; 
however, determining a successful cyber defense is a demanding task. 
Deterrence injects a belief that a credible threat of undesirable counteraction 
exists, and the cost of action exceeds the expected benefits (Jasper, 2015, p. 
61). Cyber deterrence is difficult, and Jasper (2015) notes that “deterrence has to 
work in the mind of the attacker” (p. 60). The technical properties of cyber 
methods make attribution challenging, and this allows actors to carry out 
operations with near anonymity and impunity (Jasper, 2015, p. 62). Emilio Iasiello 
(2014) also accepts the difficulty of cyber deterrence, and he argues that “it is 
extremely difficult to determine attribution in cyberspace where savvy operators 
have a multitude of obfuscation techniques to thwart defenders from correctly 
identifying their true point of origin” (p. 58). Attribution is a fundamental 
component of all deterrence strategies because it is dependent “on the defending 
state to positively attribute” an attacker before the initiation “of any retaliatory 
action” (Iasiello, 2014, p. 58).  
NATO has utilized a comprehensive approach for cyber deterrence to 
coordinate members in NATO “operations by capitalizing on shared interests, 
complementary opportunities, and mutual procedures” (Jasper, 2015, p. 75). 
However, cyber deterrence is controversial, and it is not easy to find a clear 
approach.  
Some of the considerations for future research could include whether 
NATO should take an offensive posture or remain defensive in the cyber domain, 
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or whether the alliance is already starting to use offensive operations in the form 
of active cyber defense strategies. Further, future research could explore what 
specific policies are required for NATO to have a successful cyber defense.  
When it comes to the possibility of using a nuclear deterrence strategy to 
set an example for cyber deterrence, Jasper (2015) argues that an enemy knows 
the destruction that will result from nuclear aggression; however, this is not the 
case for cyber because of the secrecy of cyber weapons (p. 65). Iasiello (2014) 
supports this idea by saying that similar strategies in nuclear deterrence are not 
transferrable to cyberspace. Only several “states have demonstrated the 
capability to” build up nuclear weapons, whereas “more than 140 nations have or 
are developing cyber weapons, and more than thirty countries are creating 
military cyber units, according to some estimates” (Iasiello, 2014, p. 54). 
Building on the concept of deterrence, a set of questions for another 
possible future research could include the following: If nuclear deterrence 
strategies are not directly applicable to cyber deterrence, what should NATO’s 
cyber deterrence be? Can special operations tactics and strategies be applied to 
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